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OHAPTER I
PURPOSE, SCOPE AMI> llE!fflOD
The· purpose of this stlld7 bas been to find,. tb.rough an

examination of John DE>T1ey•s writ:lnss. his thoughts and ideas
on tho question o:r tlle 11ature of
spoken out

Ol'l

na11e

this subject cU.rectJ.y.

g11aph here and a sentence there.

By

Deny has never

Thero is only a paraemploying these

sentences and paragraphs as they came from Dewey's pen., a
systematic and valid presentation ot Dewey's position has
been prepared.
T'.ae scope of this study bas been tllo writings of John
Dewey.,

Of course., Dewey did not in every book• mu.ch loss 1n

evo~J ai~t:.tcle, address himself directly or indirectly to the

question of the nature of man.

The

aroator bulk of Dewey• a

literary output has been searob.ed• however• for references
to the problem.

been used.

In general only Den7'a own \70rds have

In some 1nstrmoes a quotation bas been drawn

1n .from a critic or a Sllpporter

ot De•OJ'•

This was done to

illuminate a point that Dewe7 himself had already made.
Secondary sources have not been used tor the prima.17

l)l'esentat1on.

Unless othervd:so noted 1n the text itself.,

all quotations

are from the pen of John Dewe7. Where any-

one else :ls. quoted, that autho:tt 1s named 1n an 1ntl'Oduoto17

aentenoe.

2

Dewey h i mself' hns been all.owed to speak.

not an interpretation.

This stucl.7 is

In fact., interpretation of any k1nd

has been stucl:l:.oualy avoided.

From the mass of Devrey• a works

an aburidru-:.oa of' quo·cat:i..ons bave been cll'awn that refer to the

problem a.t hand.

The se \'lore arran~ed 1n suoh a fas.11.ion that

Dewey baa addressed himsel~, with so e degree of continuity,
to t h e probl em t hat has been sot up.

It will be neoeasa.."7

to tie t h e quot ations from Dewey to(Sether nith words of
co11text and time., bu t nothing ha.a ooon either added or subtro.ctod f'r om what Dewey h i mself had said.
There a.re "jumps" 1n t h e progroosion of D<:n.vey 1 s thought
as t 1 c study has presented it.

Ho\"1ever,. tho reader must

romombor that
Un!'ortunately his ["De11oy•,y psyohol031oal discus aions are scattered throusnout his various
\'ll"it '=n ·a, and no,'l:iere systematically devoloped.
To a w ~5e ~tent they are programmat1o, lacking
the details which ue so neoess&17 to oinvert
an insight i11to a direotins hypothesis.
The content and the arrangement of tho chapters in this

· st-udy reflect the endeavor to plaoe the study within the
f'rll!lle,10rk of Dewey's ph11osophical thought•

The reader will

note that all chapters lla.ve beon related to sooial inter-

action.

Chapter

v.

Tho Soul• is an exoeption.

However.

this chapter of antithetical nature is necessary for an

understand:L11g· of wbsequent chapters, whioh are sooiall.J'
related.

DE>TII9).
an Intelleotua1 Portrait
P• 116.

1 s1.dney Hook, Jo...'m
(Nev Yom: John Day co., 1

DEWEY' S Pl!ILOSOPH:!C POSITIOi:T I I{ RBLA.TIOllJ TO ~E PROBI."EM

Tb.1a chapter is not an attempt to g ive t h e reader a
b1or;raphy of John De,·rey.

T..'lat

can eas1J.y be raa.d., 1n

rather complete form~ i n Sch ilpp'a The Philosophy of
John De\·rey .

Instea.d 1 the 001'lcern is nith those experiences

out of Dowey' s lif'a t h at together produced the bao!cgroond
Ol"

ttle i"oundation upon ,:,·h ich Dewey later built his por-

sonal ph:lloaoph:lo position.
Dl.lr:lng hi s student days Dewey read voraciou sly.

He

na e pcu~tic1,, larly interested :1.n the philosophy o-£ Rogel., and,
na he hi~ soJ.i' later said., Me pel
on h is th.i11lri:.1g .. J.

11 lef't

a permm1e11t doposit"

r.111ile a. student• and even 1:10re ao wh ile

an i..1'lctructo:r. at tho Unive1"aity of' I.t1ch1gan., De\-1ey came to
be ilu'J.uenoed by Geor6 e s . r..torr1s.

?,!orris., an established

philosophel"' at that tilne 0 was a."l Het;el1an., but one who
emphasized " a l ogic of' t h e processes b;y vrhich knowledge is
acquired " -- a lo5 ic completely "emancipated .from Hegelian

ga:r-b.'!2

T'ne :tntil.iate relationship bot.'Tleen Dewey and !orris

1 Jano Dewey, " Biogra phy of John Devey," T11e Phil.osophy:
of John Do\Yey, edited by Paul Sohil?.P (Evanston., Iil1no1s·:
Uorthwostern University Press, J.939) 1 P• 17.
2

Ib1d., P• J.B.

4

'\"las not o,'lly on t ho academic planeJ :Lt was a personal friendship of mutual. roapect that included both families.

There

Vias one other man wh o had a hal'ld in shaping Dewey I s e:u1rly
t h inlting .

That waa C-eorge

arbert tiead.

r.! ead, also a

professo1., a·G t he Uni versity of' 1.11ch1gan. had formulated a
t mo1•y of ·the 01"iBin of: t l1e self t brough social interaction•

.

and Dewey t ook this f onnulat1on ovor into his own philosopny .S

As a

1..esult

of t his relationship with ?.lead., DeT1ey

na s c oncerned throughout h io li!'e with the possibilitieo
and t b.e probl e1us of aoc:1.al 1ntoraot1on.

Jud5 ing from t h e i nterest that Dewey bad in He~el and
t he oi'feo·t t lla:i. Hegel had on Dewey. it r,ould seem anyth ing
but

i,..a

t u.ral t o say that Dewey harbored soma thoughts of

idealism.

Howeve1", llor ton "!bite feels., and appears to show,

that t hore is a move1110n t o!' Dewey's tho'U.(Yl.t f'rom idealism to

:1.natrumentali sm t h rov,811 various stages.4

Thia ntransi'ormation11

a.a t'ihita calls it, took pla ce in t he early 1890' s.

This ob-

serva t i on by •n1:tta has been intent1onalq noted in order to

point out something that the reader will find in this study

or

Dewey .

In order to avoid the poss1b1llty of meaninsless

end conf'liotin{;; st atements in. Dewey -- something t hat cou1d
perhaps occur if a ttention were centered on the transfomat1on

· 3xb1de, P• 26.

4-.torton White, The Origin of »ewe1•a InstX'Ul!lental1am
(New York: Columbia Un1veri!ty- Preas, 1943), passim.

5

period -- material. has been drawn only from the later and
more cons i s ten t y ears of Dewoy' s ph11osoph1o life.

.

Hm1evor0

this means by ..pa s s ine; onl y the 1'1rst ten years of Dewey• s

\'l.aole prof'oas 1onal l.if e •
One or t h e most important faotors to remomber is that
Dewey is a natura list, anrl
il.s a na.tura.J.i st. h e accepts the findings of so1enoe
t hat the physical. has temporal priority. But as far
a a man i s con cerned~ the social. is the widest and
most complex mode of a..s soe1at1on into ,1h1oh man as
a paycho- phy sice.l creature can enter. It is in
aocia.l l i f'e tllat a l mos t al.l of the qualitieo t hat
ue r e @ll~d a s di s t inct1vel.y' human appear.. AndD as
we sh all see, in i nd1catin6 r1heroin 11 the unity of
the hw.w.,."'l. b e :lng 11 lies., main emphasis falls upon the

qual ity of int er-personal relationships wh ich are
.fou.nd in t he r ealm of t h e soe1a1.,6

~ilo soc ial. l.,eco... a s t h e all in all for "J)fmey.

Of course. the

social a1 t."Ue.tion l ies wi th!n a natural settin{i.

The point is

t hat Dewey 's aoc1al-natu.ral1sm doas not recognize any otl1er
a~oa of activit y ~ of oausal rols.t1onsliip1 or of conoequenoe.

~rle Boyer notes that
atural1sm a a a system of metaphysics rejects any
idea of causa l factors existing in the universe
above ancl apa~t from nature. The natura list can
see no reason for accepting the 1deal_1 stic position
which interpr et:s Ilflture as a product of an

Absolute llind.6

Among some philosophers there is a thought that above
5 .sidney J-Iook, John Det1ei an Intellectual Portrait
(?Jew York: John Day Oo •• 19 9 J, pp, !ia-119 •
6r!erle Boyer., J-I1fr:ays of Ph11osopl:t[ (Ph1la(ifl:i,ph1a:
Uuhlenberg Press, 1§19, P• 224.

G

and beyond the empiricnl thero is the ideal, and that 1n
some .far::b.1on the :i.cleal transmits itsel:r to the mind of man.

Dowoy would d eny e vel.""IJ syllable of tho preoed:tn3.

Ideal.a.,

and even mind., exist only in the 3ocial situation, and their
existence is the end product of 1>revious social action.

Dewey says t hat
?,lo:reove1.""' t ho e;.l.do that result f'ro,u our projection
of a:q,erienoetl goods into ob jects of t h ought,
dcs:Lre and o.f'!'or·,, ax:!.at, only- t he:, exist as ends.
}~..ds:, purposes., exero:i.se deter1ni.ning poworin
human co_ duct . • ., • Ai ms, !deals, do not exist
simpl y in nm1ncl11 J t hey exist 1n cha.raoter, in
personality ond. e.ct;ion. 7
T'ae aoc ially empil"-Oal is i2len t h e 1,eal.

Tho hu1uan be:lng

\"ti"i;h1,.n tl e :iocie.l situation beoanes concerned with the

rolationship of his action to the consequences, to a later

action., ancl so on.

Dewey :LTldioates t h is assumption ,1aen

he say:; t hat

I!ence.forth t he quest fo1'" certainty becomes t he
seal'ch :ror methods of COl'ltrolJ that 1s, regulations
of conditions of change with respect to their
co21sequences .,a
S:l.dney

Uook ., one time student and long time protagonist

of Dewey, bas ch ai~aoter:l.ced Dev,ey as a "natural pietist. 11
In a later portion o:r t his study ne,1ey•s natural piety and

-------

7 John Dewey• A Common Faith (New Haven:

Press, 1934), P• 46.

Yale U-a1vers1ty

8 John De,7ey, ,,1uest for Certainty (New York:
Fa.loll and Oo •., 19 ). p • l.28 •

!.11nton,

7

its si&1,1:l:f'icance .for our problem will be considered.

However.,

at t hi s po:lnt the relationship of Dewey • s natural p1oty to·
othei• c 1•odos can be sl10vm..

According to S1dnc:>y Hook

Supel'l1at ~ali sm as a creed 1s hard to accept .for a
person oi' int elli ge11cc and courage; atheism as e.
doctrine isolatoa man 1'roJn tb.ose relations of t h e

physlca.1 wo1"l d wjl.ich cupport llwnan ach:levemont.
llat Ul"al piet y rocogi'lizes t ho continu:l.ty between
l1llln and na.tur e .
I t aclmowledges man's kinship of
ori51n ~ but n ot of il1terent or aim0 11th other
l iving t h:L'l'lgs . It a ccepts the natura1 l imitations
impose d on. man I s e:r.t·ort by t h e fact t.1-iat h e has

a bod3 ~ t hat ho i s a c r eature of time, hintory~

and so ciety:, o.s a. poini; o:r departure for 1:nproving
the huma.n est ate. In t h i s way natural p it>ty a v o i ds
t llo s ervilit y of thoso wh o fear the god.a and -.101.t l.d
p l acate t h em., a.a well as t h e arrogance of t hos e
\'!ho 11oul d be rods• 9

De1ey'a intel l ectual position \7as oonsta11tly i n:rlucm.ced
by his

aeceptm1ce

or

t he t h eory of evolution.

.n.a JaiUE>s O'Hara

ob SC:>l"Ved,;

That wh.ich d i Dt int.;u.i shes Dewey is tho 1md1sGUised
assurar1ce \'7ith Wh:1.ch lle aooepts t h e theo17 01'

evolution .lo
Sometime s th

i a impli cit.

fJ

11 assurai1oe 11 is explicit and at other

times 1t

But regardless of its use, if the reader is'to

understand De\'t'oy• s

t hought., tlle influence that evolution had

in Dewey ' a t h ink ing .in-, ist b e kept constantly 1n t h e reader's
minds

9trook~ OR• o1t.~ P• 214,
10James O'Hara. The Li~tationa of the Educational !l'he017
ot John De\7ey ( WasJ:,.1n@:;on., D.o.: n.p • ., l.989), P• 27.

CHAPTER III
THE ?JATURE O!i' 1.14.M IM T.i!!RMS OF INTELLIGENCE

It ought to be n oted from the very outset that t h is
chapter is not concermic'l ·with De,1eyr s ep :Lsten10l.ok,7•

T'ae

oonoer n is '71t h t he a ctive position of intelligence 1n
hwan nature, aocordinz to t he philosophy or John Dewey.

Dsuey ha s nowhere laid down, in dictionary stylQ, h is
der_nition of intelli~ence.

But 1r the role of intelligence

in h'Wil9.?l nat ure 1 s t o be examined• somo sort of uorld.ng con•

cept of Dewey 's u1:1derata.11d1ng of the te~~ intelligence will
hnve t o bo avail abl e .

In Doweyts words

Common sen se regards 1.~te111genoe as havinG e purpose,
kno\'lledt;e aa amounting to something • • • • To be
reasonable is to recognize tl1ings in tl1eir office as
obstacle s and a s resources. Inte111gence, in 1ts
ordinary u se, iD a practioa.l term; ability to size up
nnttera with respect to t h o needs and possibilities
of t he vaI•ious situations 1ft v1hioh one is callod to
do someth:L~g ; capacity to envisage th1n5s 1n terms
of the ad jus t ments a.nd adaptations they make possible
or h ind er. One ob jective test of tho presence or
absence of intell1&enoa is 1nflucmce upon behavior.
No capacity to make adjustments means no 1nte1ligence;
oonduot evincing management of complex and novel condi tions means a high degree of reason. Such conditions
at least suggest t hat a reality-to-be•lmotm• a reality
t'1hioh is the appropriate subjeot-matter of 1£11owledge
is reality-of-use-m.1d-in-use• direct or indirect, mid
that a reality rn1ioh is not 1n any way of use, or bear~
upon us.a , may go hang, so far as knowledge is conoorned •
w1d

1 John Dewey, PllilosoK~ and C1v1lizat1on (llew York1
U1nton, Balch and co., 19 , P• 41.

Q

For Do\'ley it apponrs that i11telligenoe is a product of
and an instrt1..'Dent for t he o1tu.&t1on.

If' tois 1s t h e case•

1t would be axpectod th.at Dowey ~ould disown the concept of
intelligence a s an absolute to be possessed 1n a moment.
Thus he writes t hat

Intelli gen ce is not sanething possessed once for all.
It :ls 1n c onsta.n.t 1>rooees of form1ngat and :1.ts retention
r equ ires c onstant alertness 1n observing consequences.
m1 open - mi.l'lded ,..,ill. to learn and courage in r0adj1.1stmen t .2
I11tel lig ence is a " cape.oi t.7 11 t hat is

11

1n oonota.'l'lt process of'

forminn.," a nd v,ithin t h o frame of this capacity tl'lere is a
clynw.1110 •

Roa.son is cxpcri~l'ltal intelligence• conceived after
t he pa.t-cer-.a of science• and used in t he creation of
aoc :1s.l s.1"ts; 1 t h as aornoth1.11g to do. It liberates
man f'rom t .w bondage o!: t he pa st., due to iG10rance a.'l'ld
a cciden t hardened into custom. It projects ·a b etter
future and assists man in its realization. And its
operation is always subject to test ·1n experience.
T'ue plans which are formed• the principles which man
projects as guides of. reconatruotive aot1on a.re not
d ogmas . They are hypothe·ses to be \"1orked out 1n
pract1co. and to be rejected., corrected and expanded
as t hey :rail. or su.oceed in giving our present _experience t h e guidance 1t requires. We ma.y call them
progrmmnes of action., but since they are to b e used
in makins our futv.ro aots less blind., more directodD
they a1~e flexib lo ,.3
• coordingl.J' we m.y ooncJ.ude• il'l terms of Dewey• s philo•
sopby., that intelliaence aot1'Vllted bj reason is a constant
2 Jolm Dewey. Reoonst ru.ot1on in Ph1J.osoph.y (New Yom:
Henry Holt and co •• 198'0)• PP• 89-90.

3 Ib1d •• P• 89-

10

formulator ot: dynamic hypotheses for living -- hypotheses
to be tested ru~d re-f ormulated :1.n t he orucible of experience.
If vre a r e to understand Deweyfs oonoept of 1ntell.1pnce•
.

i t vill be nece ssary to follou Dewey's formulation still
furt her into t he a rea of life.

It· ia no concession t o Deffo7

t o reoo@'li z e t hat wit h in the soopo of daily 11.ving t ho
i.TJ.d i v :ldl."!.al. :ls i,are l y f a ced by such a oloar-out situation that

he i s a bl e t hrough e xper:umntal 1ntelli5enoe· to posit one

plan, and· t ha t tha t pl an 0111. at most, have to be modified
onl y in detail m1cl not 111 structure,

.

Not even experimental

.

lnt e l l 150:nc a i s a ble to avoid a lternatives. ch oices:, or., as
Dawey hir.lae li' say s:, "!)refera:nt:tal actiOJ.?,•"

Pr ef erential a cti on in t he sense o~ solect1ve
is a un:lve1•oal trait of all things, atoms and
oulea as ,·,ell a.s plants., animals and man. • •
pr oi'er ontia.l action 1 s n ot exactly wllat makes
in

rue

c~uJe of

h'UD1311

beil'lg s.

But

behavior

moJ.e• Such
choice

unless t here is

involved in choice at least something oont1nuot.\B v,ith
action o f oth er t h i ngs in nature, v,e could i mpute
genuine r eality to it on1y by isolating man from
ne.t1.ire a.l'ld t hus treating him as 1n some sense a

supernatural be1n3 1n the l1tera1 sense.4

\' 1th'h1

t he life s1'L-uat1on the individual is faced b:,

prominent ohoioos, and the resu1tins selections have as a
consoquant the activation of other ahoioes, Tlhioh then come

to the fore.

So 1n choosing the individual. is partioipating

1n a process.

4

newoy, Phil~soph.y lllld 01v111zat1on, PP• 2'(4-9'75.

11
Choice, 1n t he d!etinotively human sense. then presents
itself as one proferonce among and out of preferoncesJ
not il'l t he sen se of onG profezaenoe already made and
s tronger t han others, but as t he formation of a new
prefer ence ou t of a conflict of preferences. If we can
say upon whe.t t he f ormul.at1on of th1s new and determina te pref e r ence depends• we aro close to finding
tba t of wh ich we ere in searob. l:ior doe·s the anawe1'"
seem fai• to seek n or hard to . .fmd. As obaerv~tion and
f oresi !lh,t develop, there 1e ab ilitv to form sign s and
symbol. E that stand f'or the interaction and movement
or th:mg s ., \'.'itb.out i.11volving us 111 their aotual nux.
Uenoe t he new p:;.?eferenoe mJJ.Y reflect this operation
of ind, especi all y t he forecast of t he con sequences.
I :r ue su.m t1p., pending su ch qual.1f1cations or m c h
coni'1rmat_on u.s i'tuJtller inquiry may supply• v,e may
say t l'le. i; a stone :.1a s i ta p referential selections
sot by a relati vel y fi.Xed$ a ri,sidly set, structure
and t hat no m1t ici pa tion of t he results of acting one
we.y or an t~ or ent ers 1nt o tho mat tar• T'ae r aver se
i,s true of h.umm'l e.ct:2.on . In so far as a variable
l i~e-h s to~y and intelligen t insight and foresig.~ t
enter int o it~ ohoi ca s i gnifies a capacity for
dol:berntel y changing preferenoes.5
.
De\'1ey

110

1he1,e

kes nan t ho absolute ~ ster of n1s fate.

llowevor~ ho doe o have t he c apa city for ~etermining 1n a
mea

~e t he uir ection of his 11.f'G~

The dli'ferenoe between

t heso tt7o ctatemcn1t a may appear., at this juncture, to be

sl i ght, if not pi cayu111sh, but t he d1st1noticm. ~111 become
increasingl y 1mport2.l'lt as we proceed.,

T'nus far a ttention has been direotod only to t he concrete .oitunti-ona of lif'o which fnoe the individual squarely.

But t here i s also t bat area of life where the 1nd1vidu.a1
creates a situation for himself.

These created situations.

aims or ideals a 1~e also a part of the nature of msn in
5 Ibid., P• 276.

la
terms of i 1"1te ll:lgenoe.

Dewey• s position is that

The ain1s W!ld !deals that move us are generated t hrouc;h
i im.ginat:l.on. But t h e y aro not made out of imag inary
stuff' . The y a r e made out of tho llal'd stu.1"1" of t he
wor l d of ph;raioa l a nd soo.:la1 e xper1enco. • . r I ma~111ation se ized hold upon t h e idea or a rearrangement
of e ..dstil'lC t hings t hat wou l d evolve new ob jects.
T'a e s ame thing is true of a pa1nter, a musician:, a
poot~ a phil a.ntb.z-opist ~ a moral proph et. The nev
vision doe .a n ot ari se out of nothing• but emerges
t hrough seein
:u1 terms of possibilities; t llat i sD
o5? imar;ination,, old ·i;ll.lngs 1n nev, relations serving
a new end ~n1ich the new end aids in creat:ing.G
0

~

!Ience ~ \7b.a·i; ia scn•ves o.a tile raYI materia l for creative activity •
•,1al1 1aa a

sil'l5le c apao:lty for intelligence and 1ntelJ.15ent

ac1;i,ri t y J but t h is capac i t y 1s !1IU.lt1-faoeted.

Ai; .firs t §lance.,

i t ~ppear s that De , ey employs .1ntell1gence in two ~a~ s or

aocord:.h-ig to t.·wo

o es" ·

nut

De we y himself aay s t h at auoh 1s

not t he case e
Reflection and rnti011al elaboration spring from and
make Oltplicit a prior intuition. .eu.t thora :i.s nothil1,;
:myat:!.oe.l about· t h :t.s .faot, and it does not siv 1ify that
t h e re tu~c t wo mode a of kl1oi.•;ledge# ane of wh i ch 1 s

appropriate to ona kind of subjeot-m.tter, and t h e
ot~er mode t o the other k ind. Thinking and theorizing
about physica l matters set out f'rom an intuition., and
re£lect1on about aff a~rs of life e.nd mind consists in
an i deat1ona l and co..~ceptual transformation of what
be5ins as an intuition. Intuition~ in short. siG?11fies t he realization of a pervasive quality such that
it regulates t he determination of rolovant dist~notions
or of whateve1.., ,'.beth.or in the way of terms or
relations. becomes the accepted object of thour;.ht. 7
It now becomes olear that for Dev,ey- all activity of the

6newey, A Common Faith ' (New Haven:
Press. 1934J~ P• 49.
··

Yale University

7Dewey~ Philosophy and 01v111zat1on, P• 101.
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1ntel1ect is oriented to the object by evaluating the object
1n terms of' experience and ~\8.k1r..g preferential aelootions

w1der the influence of' and awareness of consequonoea.
~aere is one phase of man's mental life that we have not
oonsidorcd., &.nd t lle..t ia tlle role and relation of Glllotions to

t he calculat ing uill of' intalligenooThe volitional phase of mental lifo is notoriously
connected \·;it t he emotional• The only dif'f'erence
is t h a.t the latte·r is the immediateg t he orosssectio11al., aspect of response to the 1.U'loertain and
p1~ece.1"ious~ \:.'hile the volitio:cal phase 1a t h e tendency
of' the react:ton to mod ify i11detormina.te, amb1guo1.1e
oaadit:lona in ~10 direction of a preferred a.~d
favored outcome; to actualize one of 1ts possib111tiE'H3 rather than a nother. Emotion is a h1nd%'ance
or en aid to resolute wlll aoaording as it is overwhelmine; in its immediacy or as it marks a gathering
togothor of ener5y to deal ~1th the situation ~hose
- ssue is in doubt. Desire~ purpose. plm1.~in ~
choice:, ba.ve no saning save in oon.d1tions \".ihere
somothing io at stake., and vib.ore action 1n 011e
direction r a ther than another may eventuate,w
brill{Sil'lS :!.n:i;o oxiate11ce a new situation :,h ich.

fulf'ills a nead.,8

.

·

Emotional activity is t hen a conoomitant., eithe~ positively
or 11ega.t:tvel:71 01· 1ntell1gence.

,D epending upon ita use. it

oan be either oonetru.otive or destru.ctive in the dynamio of

cu..-perimenta.l i..~telligenoa.

But re~rdl.eas of its role., its

'
reality lies
in intelligm1ce., not outside it or oosido it.

Upon contemplatine t h is proposition bJ' Del1Gy., the thOUGht
occurs that emotion is a potent1a1ly dangerous factor in the

8 John Dewey., a~est for Certainty (New York:
Balch and Co • ., 192 )., P• 286.

:t.t1nton•

J.4

on-goinG development o~ intelligence 1n the situation.
Dene~ readily grants t12t
Intense e motion me.y utter itself

m

action tl't..at

deatro s inat~tuti011s. nut t be 0nl7 assurance of
t he birt h of batter ones is the JDELl'l'iage of emotion
with :L~telligenoe .9
·
De\7ey 1s a.b le to take t his position because a.e f'eels t ho.t :1.n
spite of' certain noe;ative :tnfl1.1encea einanatinc; from the
emotions., still "af'i'ection

2.11d

passionate desire '£or: justice

and socui".-ty are realii:ies in human nature_,nlO
I11telliG<::11ce always functions \"lithin the f':ra 'lS of

s ocial aitWltions. and of prime importance for t he tm.deratandi1.e; o~ t h e activity of inteli:tgenoe 1a t h e rem:J.1:1dor

t ba:~ consequences are a prominent cleterminant.

Do\'IG-:., ~

in

a broad 1nann01", l1as munmarizod 111s position :tn a few aenten oea.

Bear i n mind 1;h a.t vrhei'l Dewey speaks o:f 1de~s and

1t1eal1en ., ho io anytb.ina but Platonic.
ven ience of

OJ:.pi•e ssio1·i.

It is simpl.y a con-

Th.us he says that

T'ne con sti"lletive off ice of- thought is empir1oa1 -t.'bat 1a., experil11e11tal. "Thought11 1s. not a property
of somet hinB ten.~ed intellect or reason apart from
nature. It is a mode of directed overt a~tion.
Ideas are s.ntio1patory pla."ls and desi,31:1s vl'lich take
effect ill concrete reoonstruction of antecedent oonditicns of ox1stenae. ~a~y are not innate properties
of ?tlind corresponding to 1.lltimate prior traits o:r
Doing., nor are they A priori oatogor1es 1 posed on
sense 1n a whol.esale~ once-for-all. way, pr1or to
9Dewey• ,

Commo,1 li'..,1 th, p. 80.

lOib1d•• P• 79
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experience so as to make 1t possible. The active
power of ideas is a real:U,7, but :1.deas and idealisms
have an operati ,e force 1n 0011erete experienood
oit-u.a.tio11s; tha:lr worth has to be testad by_ thB.
specified c o11aequon ces of their operation.J.J.
Oont ra:ry t o nm.ny other ph,.losophera, Dev1ey attrioutea no

!, prio~i value to i dees.

ediac3 is both the origin and

t he mear:1u.i"e o:f eny 1c1.ea. .

Ideas

idealisms are

:JJ.1 themselves hypotheses
connectec1 T1ith opere.tiona
to be po:,.,f ormed t hey are teated by t..~e con sec1uences
o~ ~ ese operations~ not b y what exists prior to
theni. I':;:tioi,. oxpor:tanos aupp lie s the condition s
wh ich evok e i d eaa s.ncl of nll1ch thought h as to take
aocow.i.·i., ·,vith wh1oh. 1·1:; mu.a't reolcon. It f't'U'11is. ea
both ob stacloe to attainment of what is desired
e.1J.d • e r e sources ·tbat must be used to attai..t-"J. :1.t.
Concapt _or1 and systeilla of conceptions. ends in view
and pl~nP ,,. O.l"e constantly making m,.d :romakin,e as
fa s t as t h ose u.lree.dy 111 t'lSO reveal t heir \Yeaknesses,
de:foots a.nd positi~e values. There is no predestined
coui"se ~hey mt.1st f ollow. Human experienoe conso1ously
buided by i de as e,..olvoa its own standards and
measures and each new experience eonstr-~oted by
t 11ei1" mea.i'ls is an opportu.~ity ;for now ideas a11d
w 1d

not i'i:i:1a.litieA .

Deil.1g

idoa ls.12

The unusual 1:>art of t h 1s ,,hole oonstX'Uotio11 1s broufiht
to l ight by

2.

statement ma.de by Dewey that appears to

qualify sharply v,hat has boc,n so qste1natically oonstru.cted.

!nte1li3enoe bocoma s ours 1n the degree in which
oe use it a..YJ.d accept responsibility for oon.sequences. It is not ours orig inally or b y production. "It th1t1ka 11 is a truer pqoholocical
statement tha.11 11 I think. 11 g],1oughts sprout and
ve6etate; ideas proliferate~ They come .from deep
11newey quest fox- Oerta.int:y;:, PP• 166-167.
11
12

roid • ., P• 167 •
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uncon sci ous sourooa.13

It i s Dewey• s l s st sentence that ia d11'1'1ou1t to integrate
,11th t he m.ny par a.graphs that ho has o1'1"erec1 previou aly.

~ e sent~nce oaours at t he vexry end of a length¥ oonatructio11., m1d i t is with out further explanation.

Tile

di~fioul ty i ncreases when another paradoxioal atatecent by
Dewey i s r ecalled.

11 t bat is di stinctive of :man• mark1nc; him off from
the clay he ,mllta upon or t he potatoes he eats~
occurs in 11.is t h o11€ht and emotions, 1n what we have
nGreed to call eon soiousnesa.14
And no de fin i tion o f "con so1ousness" follows 0 t h ough it :maJ'

be infer red ~rom the to~'\lity of Dewey's philosophy.
lo

have s een t hat oonoequ.ences play a strong a11d deter-

min:tng r ol e i n the individWll.•s reasoning .

Societal sanction-

val ue i a a dded to t he con sequences bJ' inserting t he concept
of individual liability.
If t .w man• s nature,, original. and acquired• make him
do what ho doea. how does his action differ from that
of a s tone or tree? liavo v,e not parted Tlith any
fil'Ound !'or re spona1b111ty! rib.en the question 1a
lool::od a t in t he t'aoe of f'aots rather than 1n a
d1aleot1c of ccncopts it tums out not to have 8D1'
terrors. Mold ing men to responsibility may make a
decided d1fi"erenoe 1n their future behaviorJ ho1d1Dg
a atone or a tree to responslblilty is a meanin~leas
perfo~ceJ it bas no oonsequenoeJ it makes no
diff erence. Ii' we locate the sround of liability
1n future consoquenoea mther than 1n antecedent
causal conditions~ we moreover find ouraelvea in
13John De\7ey. Human Nature and Oonduot (lfow York:
Henry llolt and Co •• 1922)• P• 814.

14Dewey, Ph11oaopb.y and 01.v111sat1on, P• 5.

17
aoco1'"d ,·1i t l'1 act"llal practice. Xnf'anta. idiots. the
:1.naa.na. t h ose c omp1otely up set. are not h eld to
liab i lity ; t he reason 1s that it 1s absurd -meaninc l e ss -- to d o s g ~ f or it has no eff ect on
t h e:1.r f\U"th ar actions.J.0
Dewey i s h or s ae.y ine that not 011ly is t h e individual to
make a l l decisions 1n terms of the aonsequenaes. bu.t he is

also t o t ak e i nto t h e reason ing process t he factor t hat he
personally io liable f or t · e con aequenaos o:r ll1a pre.1"erent1a1

action .

Social sanct i o1u. a re to be considered.

·o 1ove~.,

t h i s si1nplo external pre aaureg onf'~roed with t h e presence of

reoiproca l t r eat nont. i s not sufficient in itsolf~
Some enirn!ll s., do130 and h orses., have their futw::e
conduct modified b y t b e way they are treated. ·1e
can i.'11(1.5 ine a .mai1 whose conduct 1s changed by t he
\'lay in -.m.i oh he i s treated., so tba t 1 t bec01Ues
d iff'e1' e11.t f r om ,·,ha t i t r,ould have been, and yet like
t he dog o r b.01, se., t he change may be duo to pu...--ely
ext ernal nw.nipulat ion., as extemal ao the strings
t hat move a puppet. Tho wholo story has not t hen
been told . 'lhe1"tQ mus t be some praot:lcal participation
.from \'li t h in to make the change that 1s effected
signif icant in rolation to oho1oe and freedom.
From \7ith in -- t m t i'aot rules out tho appea1.,
so faoi leiy made, to will as a oause.l.6
rt:i.8h,t

at t h is point thsre is a large hiatus 1n the

philosophy of John De\1oy .

that

11

rt is not suf.tic1Gnt to any simply'

some practical participation from within" is necessary,

o.nd t hen ' rop t h.e thought ~itbout developing tho sourae and

nature of t his internal participation.
However, t h is atu~ is oonaemed pri.aarily \"11th what

15Ibid • ., P• 273.
1 6 Ib1d., P• 274 ■

-

18

Dewey has said., a.l'ld a.bsonoea and 1ncono1steno1eo of thought
are noted on l y 1n a secon dary ma,.,nor.

l:f' Dewey- 1s g,l'anted

leeve» his developme11t of t he concept of liabil1t~ continues
nith ou t a h i tch .
Mo amount o'!: paine t alten in f'om i11g a purpose 1n a
definite ca se i s f inal; t he consequences of its
a.do1:rtion must be careful.ly noted~ and a. purpose
hel d on l y as a ,·;orlcing hypothesis until reaul.ts
con!'i 1"l.1 :i.1i a r~.ghtne ss. Mistaltes aro no l onger
e i ther more unavoidable accidents to be mourned or
moral 9i.na t o be exp19.ted and .forgiven. They are
l e aaons 1n wro11g me t hods of using intelligence and
i nst ruc t ions a s to a better course in t he future.17

Gr antin§ this one conce as1on opens the door for a 00D1plote
oooial philosophy of nat uralism and with it goes

&

certain

do3roo of sel f - sa tisf action. provided the individual is
appl y:ln5 h imse lf d i ligently.

Obviously Dewey has thought of

t his last i mp l i ca t i on , too, for he offers t h i s ca,nment.
t atura l piety i s not of neoassit~ either a fata11stio
aoquiesoon oe in natural happenin5s or a romantic
i deal i zation of t he \"JOrld. It may rest upon a just
senae 0£ ~.ature a a t he ,mole of which we a.re parts.
wailo i t aloo recognizes t h at we a·re parts that aro
Ell'ked by intelligence end purpose. haVil!g the
capaci t y t o stri ve b~ t heir aid to br1nG conditions
into greater cansonanoe with what 1s humanly
deairable.18
At a.'llot.lier t :1-. e Dewey

stated that

Inclividuality 1n a social and moral sense is something to be wrought out. It meana initiative.
inventiveness., varied resourcefulness• assumption
of responsibility 1n cho1oe of belief and oonduot.
These are not gifts., but achievements.

Rooonstruotion 1n Ph11osoph.y. P• 140.
18newey., A Common Faith., p. 25.
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As aohievomonts., they- are not absolute but relative
t o t he u s e t ..w. t is to bo ma.de of them. And this
vari es '71th t h e environment.J.9
Ind:lv:ldual 1t y . s E>l .fl10od., has aob.ievc,d a cortain status.,
but even t h is i a re l at.,.ve t o its use v,ith1n 't1"1.e environment.
Hen ce , t he qual i t 7 o.r tL0 aeli'

oa11

b e manipulnted through

t he conoent r :ite c :L.'"'l st m'IJDent s 0£ our social. environment. our
social ins t:U; u t i ons •
~

And Dewey con ours with thi s con clu sion

on he wr i tes th~t
\. en t ho cell' ia regarded a.a somethi ng complete .1ith1n
itself.:, t ~en it i s r eadily argued t hat only intemo.l
mor a.listi o chs.n .Je s a.re of 1111portanoe 1n genera l ref'orm.
Inatitu.tionai c ai~Be S aro said to be merely extemal.
Thoy uay a dd conven3.en oe s and comfort~ to l.ii'e.:, bu.t
t hey cam ot efi'oot n;ioral 1..-nprovemen ts. • • • Individuals
a re l ed to con centrat e in mora l introspecti on upon
t heir onn vioe a a~ d virtues., and to neglect the
ch a racter of the environment • • • • But when solf-h ood
is poroe:ved to be an a ctive process it is a.lso seen
t ri.a t social modi .fioa tions a 1•e t."'1.e only moans of' the
orse.t i on o:r ch aI15ed persona.l.1t1es. Institutions are
vieued i..~ ~ 1eir educat ive effect: nith reference to
t b.9 t.7pes of' ind ividuals they i'oster.20
S·i;_ll any pe1"son vfa o is t h e least bit ob servant will

not ice that hwnan b ehavior does not a1ways follow aooo:rding
to Dewey • s patte rn. nor are oorroot1ve measures so easil.y
and e.f'.recti vely establi shed.

Furthennore. the institution

1a onq as ei'i'octive as t l'.ie total support of t he persona who

have e stablislwd it.

Ordinarily some d1f'.1'1ou1ty \'lould ar1 se

r ight here 1n tl~e structure of Dewey's system oi' thought,

19Dewey., neoonstruotion 1n Philosog, PP• 152-163.
20
Ibid • ., PP• 153-154.

0
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but he io able to ove.rcome the diff'ioulty -- provided he is

allowed anothe r hiatus.
'l'b.e posi.t i on of natural. .1nte111eenoo 1s that t here
e.r.1sta a mixture of' good and ev11,. and that reoonsti~,ction iH t he cliract1on of the good wh ioh is
indi cated by ideal ends• mu.st take place. if at
all ~ throu.B},. conti?r'1ecl cooperat1·.re eff'ort. T:"lere

: s a t l east en ough b 1pu1se toward justice., kincll:t.ness,.
01..del" so t hat i f it ,·:era mobilized for action,·
n ot expectin~ abr-upt and comp1ete transformation to
occur~ t h e di s order, cru.e1ty. and oppression t hat
ex ist i,ou ld be reduoed.2l.
e.."ld

It i s a considerable concession to allon Dewey to posit
his

11

-

xn.1.l se t oward. jus tice:, kindliness. and 01.,dere"

Hotrever.

t h i s :ts 't'lhat De wey ha s blandly posited,. and' since t h e e~
plor·.tio11 oi' h i s phil.osophy of the nat1.1re of men is the
PUl"poso oi' this study:, the point oe.n only be noted in passing.

Dawey t hen employ s the educative means of social in•
ati t u.t:lon:; tov:arc1 one end, :t,n terms of the 1•01e of' intelligence i n t llo natv.re of

1i1.an:1

who :l.11 turn is• :111 society.

The m1nc1 of Lun is being babituated to a no,, method

e. id ideal.: 'lhe:tte is bi\t one sure roa.d of' access to
truth -- t he road of patient, ooope1"ative i.'lqui:eyoperating by mean~ of observat1ona exper1ment.
re.cord and. controlled ref'1ection.i:i2

A.~d so t he g reater development of intelligence th:ro\lf3h social
interaction beoomea both the means and the end of' Dev1eyra

society.

2

1nevey-. A Common Faith, P• 4rt.

22Ib1d., P• 32.

•
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It (fai th :tn tho poas1bil.it1es of cont1nuod and
rigorous mquiry) trusts t..~a.t the natural 1nteract1ona
bet11ee11 nm.n and his environment \"/11.l breed more
L.~tell i genoe ana generate mol'8 knowlodge provided the
ociontifio metP.ods that dofine intelligence in
opei,..~.t:.on are pu.s hed further into the mysteries of
tho world.11 bo:1.n~ t hemselves promoted and impi"oved 1D
the operation.2o
·
.
De,,oy has :rt a.·Ged 11 as noted several. parasraphs back,
t hat in :11..ci.t u1-a.l

evils

i l'l tellir:;e11ce thero is a mixture of c ood and

He has a l.so s aid that e:cperience sel'Ves to shape

t hought and :lclea.

,!i l l be

mixt'Ul...e

The s :i.mple o anclusion then is that there

of good and evil t.llou§hts and ideas cir-

c1.1J.a t ine a.mane men; t hat hwnru1 intelligence u1ll propagate
t h i s miJtturo t h i ..ov.gh t 't.?.e ei.- iploymont of 1'eason or oxper1mental
1nt e l l:1gence .

To t '_:ls Dev;ey replies that

Our !tdeas ti:'l.1.ly deDend up011 exper1m1ce., but so do OU%'
sen sations. And th.a experience upon v1hioh they both
depend i s the oper ation of ha.bits -- ori51nally of
i nstincts. Thus our purposes al".d commands regarding
actio11 {whother physical or moral) come to us through
t .,e re.f.ractine; medium of' bod1ly and moral habits.
Inability to think aright is suff1a1ently striking to
11.e.ve caught the a tten tion or moralists. But a false
psy chology has led t\lem to interpret it as d~e to a
necessary ·eontliot of fleah and spirit. not as an
indication t hat our ideas are as dependent, to say
the least., 1.1.pon our habits as are our acts upon our
conscious thou@1ts and. purposea.24
The Dewey formula would then read: Since

YJe

are under the

deterJ31~1st1c influence of our habits. origina.l.J.y, of our
instincts. wo ought to develop better habits for a better 111'e.

-------

23
Ib1d • ., P• 26 •.

2 4nevey., Human Nature and Conduct, P•

sa.

aa
It would bo intoroatil-ig to etudy the relationship and
developioont of instincts mld habits 1n Dewey's philosopb¥•
Ono final q1..iast1on come s up.

Does not h iator:, show.

as some ma1'l have so.id, tbat t he common greed of men roduces

life to t ho struggl e of a ll against all• clique a gainst
ol1que. or clas::i a.gg.inst olass'Y
To conceive oi.' 111.1.man history as a scene of struggle:,,
of classes for do1aination• a struggle caus ed by love
of poner or g r eed for gain• is the ver:, eythology-

of t he emot1o1'ls.

What we call h istory is largely

non- human. bu.t s o far as ~tis human, 1t is dominated
hy intel ligence: h istory is the histoey of 1-'lcreasing
0011sc1ou::m.ess .25
\1bo.t De1-;e y ., in b is own ,·,ords, said about 1nte111gence

hao been presented.

Bu.t what role does intelligence play

1n t h.e de.:ll y l if'e of the individual, according to Derrey•s

w1der standin5 of :lntelligenceT

Le Boutillier has prepared

a br:tof parag raph t ll..at very- neatly ties toc ether all that
Deuay said~ s.nd she a pplies it to the question t hat has been

posed.

Sho writes.

Intelligence and effort are the active forcos of what
1 1mid deep and enduring
support to the processes of living•, which take, man
out or h i msel.1' to manipulate hio environment and to
actualize his ideals. These forces are a .t work 1n
all of mw.1 1 s activity, t11rough mioh he trues up
t he pattern of his life to ooni'orm to bis values
oven while he derives his values :f.'rom the pattern of
his lif'e. So1enoe and art and rol1s 1on all have a
part in this. Science a11d art and religion,, ,1hich
are, perhaps, our hi&hest va1us a, are methods bJ'
r.ewey calls •adjustment•, Ylhioh

25
John Dewey, 0 Ia ltature Good!
Journal., VII (July, 1909), 837.

A oonveraaticm, 11 Hibbert
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which v,e may bring out of nature mid make explicit
and rolated ti.nd meaningf'U1 waat 1a 1n nature, and by

which we aotuaJ.:tze 1n nature the ideals we thus

de r:lve .26

26oornel1a Le :eout1111er, Rel1g1oua Values 1n the
Philosopb.Y of Emorsent Evolution, brew Yorks n.p., 1936),
P• '17.

OH.APTER IV
THE ?JATORE OF

H I!i TE.il ;.fS OF SOCIAL INTBRACTIO:tJ

The social s.1 tuation and t h e inter-personal relations
of pe1"so11a vrithL."'l the social situation are vitally important

for Dewey • a philosophy.

This has boen aho\m in t h e d1soussion

of intoll1.gonce .•1ith i 11 t he 11atura of

Intelligence ,·,as

li'13ll•

discus sed w:.. thout emterine; 1n a full measure into t.11.e social

frruna •

.B'~ t to U11dorstand completely the

mrking o:f this

1ntoll1Genoo and its manifestations, direct attention must
be g iven to t : e area o:f social 1ntei•ot1on.,
Dewey doos 11ot deny that every child at birth has a

capac i t y

0 1•

1ntoll16enca., but a sharp degree of variance

arises :i.n tho yea:rs in which the O?-ild interacts with other
individuals in society.

It has boen pointed out. as

Le Bout!ll1ol" did., that intelli5onoe sllapes experience. but

a.t t he same ti .1e social oxperiencea have a reo1prooal efi'eot.

For exampl.e 0 habits are mental constructs that are derived
1'Z'om s::>oial experiences.

bits as organized aot1v1t1es are secondary and
acquired, not native and or1g1na1. They are
out~rowths o:f \U'llearned aot1I1t1ea vlaioh are part
o:f 1uanta ondomnent at birth.
In the cwrse of living the child feels the pinge oi'

social stilml1• and in turn the child develops a set of
1

John Dewoy0 H, r / Nature

Henry Holt and Co. 0
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rather standardized responses.

:ct is those stanclard1zed

reoponses th.at Dowey calls habits.

Tl1e essence of hl.ib1t 1s an acquired predisposition
to v1ay..! or modes of response, not to particular aots
except o.s., tmde1~ spooial. conditions, these express
a. way o~ behaving . Uabit means special sensitiveness
or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli,
3·c:;anding predilections and aversions, rather than
b&re reourrenca of speo1.t"1o acts. :Ct means ~111.2
Obviously · is i a not u rote development.

The intelligence

of t he oh ild plays a st~rong role 1n t h e grorrth of a b ody of
ha.bita.

rI0'\"10ver., t he f'actor to be

noted at this point is

that soc s.a1- interaction al.so plays an important par1; in
ta development of habits.

On the basis of tho material

prosent od t hus far 3 1t om~ be oa1d t hat social relations are
t ho a round and :t..~telligenoe t he fooua of habit formations.
e 1ey hin1sol f illustrates this tight inter-relationship

bet1een il1~ell1Gence a nd social interaction.
{abits may be profitably compared to phya1olo0 1oal
i'Wlct:i.ona., like 'broatbing., digestil16• T'.a.e latter
are:, to be sure., involuntal'J', vm.1le hab1ts are
acq\.\ired. But important as is this difference for
1na.."ly purposos it should not conceal the fact that
habits are like functions 1n many respects., and
especially 1n reg_uiring the cooperation of organism
and envirorm10nt.3

Since hab1.ts are ":mo<les of response" to social stiml111,
it is necessary that t he ?Srt1oular response be oriented to
the intelligence of the receptive individual -- as Dewoy aays•
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In short. the moanina of native aot1v1t1es 1a not
native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction 'l:·1 .ith a matured social _med1Ulll.4
ThE> devalopmsl'lt of habit vritllin the individual has

been seon.

no,1 attention

is turned to the g rowth of a bod7

of habits wi t h in the :i.11d1vidual who both influences and is
inf'l uonced by s ocial 1n ·~eraotion.

Social interaction .woul.d

be a mi11inum f actor i~ ha.bits n~re passive, but according to

Deuey t he ver y opposite is true.
" ch pe r s on is born an infant, and ovary infant is
subject £rom t he first breath he draws and the first
ocy he u ttors to t he a tte:mtions and demands of others.
~be ae o thers are n ot just persons 1n general uith
u1:lnda in e;ene ra.l. '!bey are beings v,ith he.b5.ts~ and
b e il.1t a who upon t h e ,,hole esteem the habits they have.
i f i'o1" no other reason than that haviJJG them, thoir
imag ination is t h ereby- lindted. The nature of llab:tt
is to b o assertive~ 1ns1stent. self-perpetuatin{l.5
1'lli s be i.ng t lle case• 1 t can aaf'ely be said that in t h e earlT

mon t h s o~ t h e 11.f'e of' a child he is• 1n terms of habits.
moro t he inoved than the mover.
t he body

or

However. as time proceeds

h abits that have developed begin to assert

t.'1en1selves in response to social stinul.1• and a balance of
social inf'luence remlts.

Of course• there are :lndiv1d1.1a1

exceptio110 to t h is .formulation,. depending upon the stron0 th
of t h e il.• aharaoter .•

For De\1ey., character appears to be the sum total of
habits f\U1otioning 1n the aooial situation.
4 Ibid-., p •· 90 •
5 Ib1d.,., P• 58.
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Character is t11e 1ntorpenetration of hab1ta. If
each ha b it o::tisted in an insulated compartment
and operated wit h out affecting or beigg effected
by o•iih era, character would not ex:l.at.6 ·
Characto1.. ., the1"1., b ecomes the end product of tlle sooia1
I

inter-play of habits.

'lhe adult wllo has tho advantage o~ s reater .oxperience,
and so of •·rea.ter habits, does not ordinarily look upon tho

child aa one who is ~.nan ideal position to mcB1ve a
d:i.sor i mine.te h abit edttoa.t1on~
Dewey 1

Rat..'lier., it appears from

t..'lla.t t h e adult views the oh1ld as a living area to

bo exploited by mea>.'ls of t..lte habits of the adult •

.

!ie a ome back to t h e f'aot that 1ndiv1dual.s begin their

cmrce_ as infants. ~or t he plasticity of the young
pres8n ts a temptation to those having greater experience and !lance greater pov,or -r1h1ch t hey rarely
resist. It aae•ms putt.7 to be molded according to
curr e11.t deai gns e That pl.astioity- also means po,1er
to c hange prevailin~ custom 1s i gnored. Docility
is looked upon n ot an ability to learn ~Jh.atever
t he world has to teaoh, but aa subjection to tl~ose
instruc~i on~ o'!: othe rs \".1,:11ch r e.fleet t heir current
ha bits .

I'i:; i a quite understandable that De1f0y- would speak 1n

t j 1a manner~ for he 1s deeply conoemed with roform1ng and
improving tha aoc1al life of men through the peou11ar po,1ers
and a bilities t11at men innately possess.
Dewey 1111.l'J.e si•i;a.T).tlJ'

chastises tbB 1nd1v1du.al tor soo1a1 short-

ooming a that are oxperienoed 1n the world.

6

Ibid., P• sa ..

7 Ibid .. , P• 64.e

For that reason
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Our se1r~10ve 0 our refusal to face facts. combined
perhaps with a senso of' a possible better although
u.-ru;,eal:tzed self'~ loads us to ejeot t he habit from
the t houfiht 0£ ourselves m1d oonooive it as an ovil
pOl·ter which h as 3omeho\1 overcome us•
'le f'eed our
c onceit by recallil1c; t hat t he habit ,..,as not delibor a tely f ormed ; ue never intended to become
itUei"s 0 1• gamblorm or roues. And how can anything
be deepl y ourselves v1llich developed aoo1dentally.
without set int ention! T'nese traits of a bad habit
are precisely the thinas ~h1oh are most 1nstruct1vs
a bout all ha.bits and about ourselves. They teach
us t hat all. hab:lts are affections., t.,'lat all h ave
projectil e po~~r~ and that pr~d1spos1t1on formed
by a number of spec ific acts is an immensely
moro ~..nt izrulte and fundamental part of ourselves
t hal'l vv.~"'U<:> 0 s enei..al. con scious choices. All habits
are dam.ands 1.'or oe:-tain kinds ot activity; and ti'le y
constitute t h e self . I11 any intell151ble sense of
t he r10rd wil l ., t h ey are . ·will. They .form oul'...
ef'feot:i.ve d esires ana~hey f'urni.sh us with our
7orkin.$ capaci t ies. They rule our thoughts,
doterm1ning which . shall appear arJ.d be troa and
uhi ch sho.ll pass from· 11sht into obscurity.
Dl.trin6 the oou,...se of

a body or hab it s.

1s life tne individual ln1ilds up

These habits remain encased in the salfJ

for that matter., t h ey ax-e the self'~ and even as tho nerves
are al\7a.y s poised ready to respond to any stimuli., so also

t he sol£., thia body o~ habits., stands oonstS11tly ready to
respond and constantly responding to any social stimr.tli.
Dewey indica tes

habits.

that t here are factors tending to restrain

~41ether or not the habit or the restraint wins out

depends upon the strength o.f tho stiml2lus and the strength

o~ t he hab1t-dispos1t1on-att1tude.
Attitude and., as ordinaril.y used,. d1spos-1 t1on suggest
something latent, potential• oomething whioh requi%'oa
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n poai t i ve stimt.\lus outside themselves to beoon1e
acti ve. If wo perceive t h at they denote positive

forms of action i:1b.1oh are released !119rely t hroU£;h
ramovai of some-counteracting 'inhibitory' tenden cy,
and t.l-ien b ecome ovort, ,, e may e mploy them instead

of the nord he.bit to denote SL\bdued, non-patent
for me of t ho latter.

In this case., we must boar in mind that t he uord
disposition means predi sposition, readineaa to ElOt
ove r t l y in a speoii'ic .fashion whenover opportunity
1a pre sen t ed., t h i s opportu."'lity c onsisting in removal
or t he nressw.~e due to t h e dominance of soroo other
habit ; and tba. t e.ttit ude moans some special c ase of
e. praclisposition ., t he d i apo s ition ,1aiting as i t
were to s p r:ll'1e; t hroush an or,ened door. 9
•

.c.ven t he inhibitory ·Gendonc:Les are habits and have been
fol.•mod in t h o way a ll habits a.re

.f.'01~!!19da

Tho 1 o su.lt of this .construction of Deney i s t o make man

a compl eto aoc:tal ani l'lal.

Gi van a certain a.mount of ,.nnate

abi l ity 0 he c an build ~ or multiply• t he ori~inal ab ility
end cQpa city to almost unlimited heiEhts dependL,g upon t h e
quantity and qual i t y of oooial 1ntaraat1on.

man is t _o

quite simply

.easuro or all t h ing s.

A glanc e at the h istory of mankind would clearly indicate
t hat man l'i..aa been anything liut suaoessi'ul in h is gro\1th• and

even t he.t

m :h as e2tploited his potential 1n a way t hat

t hrea.te11a

is oun d estruction rather than promoting growth.

Of t his• Dewey, too. 1s a,mre.

A.foretime man employed t he re-sults of h is prior
experi.enoe only to f'orm customs t..'18.t henceforth
had to be blindly followed or blindly broken.
Now. old experience 1s used to S\J8S9st aims and
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m9th ods f'or devolop 1n0 a new a.TJd improved experien ce . Con.aequon tl.y experienoo Boooru9 s :1.n so far
con struct ively self-r eeu,lativep 1
·or e s pecit'icn.117 De,1oy Es,,y'B t hat
1ien who J.:Lves :L'l'l a \'10:t'ld of hazards 1a c ompelled to

se ek f oz- securit y . Ile has aoUP"j.lt to attain :J.t in
t wo \'lays . One of t hem bessn with an attempt t o
propit i a t e t he power s wh 1oh environ h im and determ5.ne his de s tinye • " • 1!1'.ne o t h e r course io to :111.vent
tu ~ta and by t h e ir means to turn the pov,ers of nature
to a aooimt; mru1 con structs a for.tress ou t oz t h e
vor y condi t i ons e.nd f orces wh ich t h raaten h i m.
Ue bui l d s ., sh e l ters., weave s ga r ments., mak e s flam
h is f'ri end inat enc1. of h is enemy. and grot'1s into the
compl i cated a r t s of nsaoo!ated liv1ng .ll
Hence Dowey ' s an &Jezt is simply that man has not as yet
ful l y acc omplishe d b e oau se he has not as yet compl e tely tri ed.
To the oxten ·~ · e.t ho b.aa t ried to exploit h is !l Otent:i.a l~ h e
has ou oceeded .a dJ:ii r abl y .

I t no\"/ remains £or the lntel.ligent

ind1,ddua.l to ro oognize t ho ob viou s concl.us i on ., and n net"/

lli."ld be t te1" way of l i f e .is 11:1.s f or the attempt.

10
John De\'7ey, Reconstruction 1n Ph.iloao~ (liTew York:

Henry Holt and Oo•• 1920)., P• 88.

11
newey. gue'3t for Oertaintf, P• 3, aa quoted by H. s.
Thayer., T'.ae I.og io of PragmatismlJew York: The Hwuan1tiea
Pross., 1952), P• 212.
·

T"d E UA'l'URE OF !;i.\!l I U TERUS OF Ti-IE SOUL

In a con sideration of t he naturo

,um

or

BODY-MIHD RELATIOHS

man ,·,o must deo.l

wit h t h e role., it' m.1y, of' the soul 1n man' a nature.

In the

elram1no.tion of Jolm Dot"1ey• s pnilooophy on this point it

will be s hovm t hat t here is a strange contradiction.
Dewey • s think ing cnru1ot i,e accounted for, but perl't.apa some

l :i.t h t can be t hronn on the matter by oonsider1na t h e books
arid j ou1".n.. ls i.."'l whioh Dewey spoke out on tbis mttor.

~•he 0110 opii-1ion, that can conceivably be 1abeled tho

minority opin:l.011 0 appears in Blbliotheca Sacra.

That po.rti-

cula~ journal i s a respected joumal of Christian philosophy
and ethic s ., and it v,ould hardly tolerate an evolut!on1st1c

article~ part1culerl,,v one tbat dealt with the sacred matter
of t he soul of' man .

This 1s t he only plaoe 1n which Dewey

exprossod himself' in the "minority" manner.

All other

expressions are con sistent, thoush :l.n oontrad1ot1on to the

firs t.
Consideration will first be given to the reference from
Bi bliotheoa Sacra, and then attention will be directed to the
more extensive expression of Dc•w ey• a view of' the soul and
body-mind relations.

Dewoy operates with the oonoept of the

soul as 1f it \'lere a foregone oono1us:lon that it existed.
His attention is on the plaoo of the soul 1n the body- and
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its .function.
If v,e include \7:lthin our survey the psycho-physiolog ical facts as well as t ne pllrely physiolos ical

phonomena of' n e rve action. '-"!O come to tile oonolus1on
t hat t he soul not only d irects and f'ocuaea the
ecti v! tiea of' the organism. but that it transforms
t he m into aomathin5 vih1ch they are not. It realizes
itself' u.po1'l t h e h inta. as :i.t v1ere. g iven by the body.
'lbe s oul is not only immanent in the body• as const1 t ut in~ l t s unity and endJ it is transcendent to
i t ~ as tran3£orming its activities £or 1ta own
p sy cb.:i.oa.l ends.l

Tho soul t hen i s a p ayc h ical entity perm9ating the physical.
body ~ gv.1c.l ing and d ire ctinB that body and g iving it ends and

pl.lrpo sea.

.1:rot ioe t h at h ere and 1n t h o follow1ng oxpreosion

Dewey doe s not even h i ni t hat there is any question concerning
t ho ontol OGY or t h e soul.

The article from \\h1oh this materio.l

uas d rawn v1iu, entitled "Soul a nd Body• 11 but the treatment
ulthin t h e a rticle is directed more specifically to the soul.
and the act.

ibe psych ical ls 1tmnanent 1n the pllys1calJ immanent
as directing it to\Vard an ·e nd and for the sake of'
t h i s en d selecting sorne act1v1t1es. 1nl1ib1t1ng
othora., respondinB to some, controlling others
and ad justin~ and co-ord1nat1ne the complex whole
so as., i..~ the simplest and least wasteful way. to
rea ch t he ch osen end. 1i e find• there.tore., that 1n
·t he a implost i"o:,u of nervous action there are
pril1aiplos to vihioh matter, as euoh, 1s an e.n tire
stra.n3er. tatter per se lmows no hi§ber cateaory
than that of physical causality. Its highest law
is that of the neoeas1t1es of antecedent and consequent. In nervous aot1on we f1nd tile categoey
of teleol.otU• The act is not determined b:y its
immediate antecedents, but 'bJ' the necessary end.
\ie have gone fitom the a~re of p~s1cal. to that

].

John Dewey, "soul. and Body, 0 D1bl.1otheca Sacra, XLIII
(April, 1886) 1 254-255.
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of f inal ca.usation, and thereby we recognise that
wo have a one from t he purely physical to the
immanen ce of t h o p sych ical 1n the phy'aioal,
d ire c ting t he latt er for its own end and purpose.2

It i o t.or th !1ot :J.ng t h at even at t h is point Devl8y has inserted

t he idea of' t he s oul sarvil'l(:S as the c1 irector, the selector,
t he inhi bitor of physical action.

In view of the fact t hat

h e has l aicl much · s t ress upon ha"Qit-action and habit-forma:tion.

oonte c onnection can b e seen .

Thia oonneot1on could very

easil y servo as a steppi ll6 stone, or a loop-hola, for the
posi•i;ion t hat Dewey held dur1ne, a greater part of b is l i terary
l ife .

Very clea rly Dewey has remarked that t h e soul transcends

t.

b od.y- 0 but t."'11 s tran soendo1"1ce 1 s not a st.\perna tural one.

Dewey• s c on oe~, t of t he soul, as it appears 1n Bibliotheoa
~aor a ., 1s spirit only 1n t he sense 1n which Hegel s pe aks of

t he spirit ancl t he spi rituai.

There 1s no connection wbat-

soeve1, with. t he Christi an concept of !I> irit and spiritual.

:;o t h e sou1 b ecomes a driving fQrce., a guid1ns

11

spirit 11 of

t he physical po,·,ers of tho boey.
The soul accord ingly, is not a powerless. i mpotent
sotmth ing , so transcendent that it cannot be brought
into relation with matter. It is a liv1ng and acting
forco wh ich has .formed, and is constantly forming
t h e body, as its omi meohan1~. This assures on the
one hand t hat no act or deed of the mind is ever lost,
that i t find its registration aid reoordJ and t h at
not alone 1n some supraluru:iry sphere, but down llere
1n ti.~e fforld of matterJ. and• on the other hand, it
forms a mechanism by- ~hioh tho soul oan i mmediately

2

-

Ibid., P• 247.
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know., can grasp the fragments of 1ta knowledge into
one s ymbolic \"/hole without 1abor10,1aly gather:l.ng
t hem a.n d piecine t hem together. and by which 1t
can inwe d1a t ely a ct • It is• as 1 t were• the mind I a
automaton . ceaselessly and tirelessly executing t h e
demands r esponding to t he needs or the sou1~

A sta tement of t his nature says in a lucid fashion that the

soul is ·i:ihe controllinG m'ld d irecting 1'oroe with in t h e body.
~'here is an inte1•a ctio11 of needs anc.l .fuli'illnents between
t ho body and s ou l• but t he sou1 is still the dom:lrumt f'oroe.
Thi s must b e compar ed trith statements made !n Human

Jature and uonduot. Deuey •a volume on social psychology .
As e,tpl icit as h e \·1as in ti:10 previous reference tom:u."d t he

exist en ce o.f

t ·10

soul, Dewey is no,·, tal,ing a · cont1"ary p osition.

The doctr 111e or a single• a1:mple and indissoluble
soul wa.s the cause rand the ef'fect of fa!l.ure to

recognize t hd.t concrete habits are the means of

lmowledt3e and thought. · • • • Mo\1 it is dogmatically
stat eo. tha~ n o s ucb. conoeptions of the seat.
aGent or vehicle will go psycholog ioally at the
present t1me .•1=

Here Dewey den i es what ho had previously stated concerning
11

aou.1. 11

Ue even avoids using the word itself' by usins

de sc r i ptive terms ins tead .
The traditional psychology of t he original separate
soul, ni1nd or oonaoiousneas 1s in truth a reflex
of conditions uhioh out human natur.e off from its
natural objective relations. It implies first the
severance ot u"W.1 from nature and then of' each man
from h is fellows. Tlle isolation of man from nature
is duly l119ll1fested in the split bet\feen mind and

4

Jobn Dewey• .Human Natura and Oonduot (New Yorks
Henry Holt and ao., l922). P• l.38.

35

body -- since body io -clearly a connected part of
nature. '!'hue t he 1.nstrwnent of aotion anrl the means
of t he continuous modification of action. of t he
OWiIU.l a tivo oarry:tns forward of old aot1v1ty into
net,., is roBarcled a s a mysterious 1gtruder or a s a
nwsteriou s parallel accompaniment.

James 0 1llara., a cr itic of Dewey's position 1n relat ion
to t he s oul~ o~fers t h is explanation of Dewey's statements.
r13ue y rejects t he d o3trine 0£ a spiritual soul
because, 1n harmony wi th h is theories, it cannot
e d emonstr ated e xperimentally • • • • Dewey's
dismiasel of t t a soul arise s from the behavioristic
viewpoint o~ psych oloKY which was considered under
t h e i'ore3 oing heading ;a

t even if De~ey d oes deny the existence of the spiritual

soul., lle wil l st;111 have t o deal \"11th the question of t he
ont ology of mmd a.~d its relationship to the physical body .
Ir ·t ho pr evious orit ic o:f Dewey is correct, and 11' De 1ey

remains cons istent . he w11i have to deny the existence of'
mi nd on t h e same empirical ground on which he denied soul.
Orea t paL.,s have been taken to permit Dewey to speak for
himself• and not to put t he name of De~ey over t he words of
enotllar.

However. 1n t h is inst:tnce t he principle is laid

aside to permit Sidney Hook to l'l1Jrnmarize Dewey's thinking.
~

physical• or l'.!atter. Life. and ?.Iind are abstractions•
according to Dewey, not existences. Existences have
physical. living, or mental character depending upon
t he set of properties t hey reveal as they develop in
time. Tho t'aot t~.at some properties whose conjunction
1nd1oates t he presence of mind emerge later 1n time

5 Ibicl., P• 85.

· 6 James O'Hara. 1'he Limitations of the Eduoationo.l 'l'heorg
of John Dewey (washington. D.c.: n.p., 1929), P• 28.
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than others doea not make them •loss renl' or less
eff'a.cacious than oth ers~ as traditional materialimn
asaumed. 'l1he fact that 1.u11der certain cir01uastanoes
phys i c a l situations are changed as a result of
operations and actions that indicate the presence
of t he mentela does not justify belief 1n A m1nd
aa a ~eparat~ power. force or vita.L energy vlh1oh
mysteriousl y a ot s upon things. ao traditional
sp:lritual.i&'ll asS1.uned. 11he problems about mind-body
wh ich hava myst i fied philosophers can only be
settled by seeing the elements r1hich have been
or1c inall y separated aa functional d1stinot1011s
uithin a continuity of hiatory.7

Thoue;h t hese 11r e not Dewoy• s own ffl>rds• they were used ·because
of t h e preciseness of' t h e formulation a nc"L also because of

t heir vo.lidit.-y in t orma of Davreyts philosophic position.
In a s :i.l' :tl ar vein Dewey himse11' v1rote th&t

~ody- mind siniply desi&ina.tes what actually taxes
pla ce Tihen a l1vina body is implicated 1n situations
of discourse. oommun1oat1on and participation.

In the hyphonated phrase body-mind, ' 1 bodJ' dos16D,atos

i he continued and conserved• the registered and
cu.mulat1va oporE'.t1on or .factors continuous with
t he l"Ost of nat"llre., inanimate as well as animteJ
Tihile ' mind' designates tlu, characters and oonseque11ces which are differential• indicative of·
f'eaturoa which emerge ,1hen 1 body 1 is engaged in a
wider. more complex and interdependent s1tu.at1on.s
De,1ey is bere developin5 his concept of 1nind from the

results of intelligence operating 1n social 1nteraot!on.
T'.a1s 1s indicated by Dol78Y' himself \Then . he call his presen-

tat1ona quoted above., a."'.l "emergent theory-

or

mmd.. 11 9

7 s1dney Hook• John
an Intelleotual Portrait
(lfew York: John Day co., l9 9), PP• iia-liS,
.

De\'781
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John Dewey• Ex!er1enoe and Nature (Chicago:

Publishing Oo • .,
9

1925, P• 285.
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Granting an emerc ent thooey of mind• Dewey will still
have to account for minds that break down. that are not able
to maintain t h e :tr po s ition nithin t h e body.

or.

perhaps

moro logic~lly . h e will have to account for the unit7 and
con sistenc y o .f' t h e ini n cl operat1n[5 within the body.

not au:f'.i'ic i on t t h at h e simply
ahcm5.!l[; it s function.

posit■•

It is

a relationship v1ithout

Si dney Hook desorlhE>a• 1n the foll.owing

quota tion~ Dewey 's attempt to do just this.
Al l of us a re va 5"Uely anare that a normul hu nm1
b e iug f'un ctions a.a a unity • • • • One of t he
r ea so11s t hat belief in t h e 'soul• has persisted
is t hat many people have sought to find a definite
locus f or t h e bon d of W'lity that marks the
pre se11ce or persor.al1ty.
l.i'o r Dewey. t he unity of the organism. considered
b iolo 1cally . cons ists in t he uay 1n ~hioh all
part s of t he body fw1ction together to produce
t he bala nce or movinG equ111brium t hat we call
t he qual i t y- of BOOcl health. But since man :Ls
n ot onl y a b iolo ·ical orcanism but a social
o::-e atura. h is unity as a hui:aan be1ns consists in
t he co-operative .functionfiig of his relationsh ips
to othe r human b e ing s :in a social environment.lU
Assun1!n,; tha t Hook bas acouratoly represe11ted Dewey.
and that l"lowey h as not ohosen to misrepresent himself on

t h is particular point, our original statement of mind being
the result of intellil onoe operating in sooial interaction
is valid for Dauey 1 s · ph1losophy.
a.it wllat are the results of De11ey 1s unitins body-• mind•

nature and society into a single functioning whole7
Dewey himself

l:ias not ano,,ered this question. but if Dewq
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is to be examined 1n the ap1r1t of Dewey, the oonaequenoea
will have to ba considered.

As a1n. Sidney Hook has prepared

an e:1m1e1...
By his emplmsis upon the continuity

or nature~

body ., s ocie t y ., and mind• Dev,ey cloee two thing o.
- o breal.:s c.lovm the dualism betv,een the physical.
and t he p sychioal wi tb.out :L"ead1ng tlle properties
or mind i nto na tu.re• e. s do the mentalists and
panpsy ohists, anrl with out denying the existenoe
o .. c 01.1 soiou sneas., a.a do extreme :e.1 ntorial1sts and

behaviori sts. Secondly., he is able to n10.ke clear
t h at •the un ity of t h e human be1ng ' consists not
i11 the s um of separate ul t!..i1El te elements., v,hother
t h ese be sensations or reflexes., ideas or
glandul ar Eeoretions., but in an observable series
o~ co-operative .:functions., a workins together of
interaot1n3 precesses., that constitute a

1.>ersona lity.J.l

One i'in.al remark bo1'01."e concluding this chapter,.

The

probl e m ch o:icn in thls paper is not entirely ne,1., as some

Do\:lay protagonists well reco(911ze..

'lhe i m 1ediate concern

io n ot to sit in judgment of' Dewey and his pll1losoph:y., mt

to exe.,.-nine :lt and see exactly v,here the man does sta..YJ.de

l o,,ever., l a bels do servo some slight purpose•
venienca.

so 100

con-

Hence, the f'ollowing final quotation is of'i'ered

concernin5 Dewey and his position on the soul and body-mind
re lat ions •

Again 1 t' s .from Sidney Hool<.

In challeng ine the dualistic theory &he mind-body
tneor:i]., Dewey has challenged one of the most pervasive determinants of' r:estern European oultUNJ•
an attitude f'ort1f'1ed by relig ion• by popular
morality. by the teachings of' tho Aoadem,- as well
as or the Lsarned Doctors. It is not aurprisine,
therefore. that it is Dewey's theol"Y' or I1uman

11Ibid., P• 111.

-
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nature m:1d human mind v.h1ch has provoked the charge
o:r mate!!":talism a gainst him, part1oularl.y 1n
t h oolo ~i cal quarters. If refusal to d 13aoc1a te
mind ~rom body and body from nature is matcri~lism,
Dewey io one of t h e e;reatest 11,aterialiats of all

t ime .12

12Ibid., P• 109.

..

CHAPTER VI

TfiE N TUR

O:fl' MAN IM TEFJtiS OF GOOD AUD EVI·L

Th e headin3 for t h is chapter is n1ore descriptive than
definitive., for D0uey •s ph1loaophy of naturalism does not of
itself reoog;nizo any area of' ''s ood" or "evil. 11

However•

Do,1ey was quito ,1ell attw1ed to other beliefs and ph1lo-

eophio s p revalent in tho uorld• and he did on occasion

speak out in r olution to these opposing views.

The reader

will note that Dov1ey is 11ot interested 1n entering into a
pol emic., but t ha t whatever h e has said• he has ~id .for the
se.l:e of di.f:terentia"i:; irig his posit1on i'rom t..'lia. t 0£ other
positions.
Phi los o phy is oonoarned only with propositions whioh
are true in any possible uorld• existentially actual
or not. Propooitiona about good and evil are too
dependen t uz,on a spoc:tal form of ox.1stenoe. namely
human betnss vrith their peculiar traits, to i"md a
place in the soheina of eoionoo. ille onJ.y propositions
wh.ich m swer to the speoi1'1oation of' pure universal.ityare lor;ical and matheme.tioal. !L'heee by their nature
t1"a11scend existence and apply to every oonoe1vable
res.J.Ii.J.l
Still even Dewey is aole to say that

SO!?l9

activities

among 111en are regarded. v:1th g reater esteem that."'1 others.

Even an instrumentalist vrlll say- that the nature of the con-

sequences varies.

Emotions have been given a strong role

in the nature of man., but on occasion an individual will be

1

J.~8 st ~or Oarta1nt7 (ltew York:

John Dewey.

Balch and Oo.,, 19),, P• 66.

Ltinton.
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guided primarily ., perhaps to h1s later regret., by his

emotions.
Dewey recognizes the foregoing conditions and poss1b11•
ities., an d he o.fi'ers t h is explanation of the situation.
Ua.n as a n aturaJ. creature acts as ma.soes and n1olecules act; h e live s as animals live, eating., fighting,
f'ear:i.l1g :, r e1>roducing . As he· lives, sor.1e of h is
ac tions y:told understanding and things talce on
1naani11n., for t h oy beoomo signs of one another;
means of e:::9ectation and of recall,. preparations
for what i s to coma and oelebr....tions of" what has
e;one. Activities ta.lee on ideal quality.
At t raot :ton and r epulaio11 beoome love of' the admirable 1u1d bate of' t h e harsh and ug ly, &nd they
seek to f i nd and • e.lte a wo1•ld in which they ·ray
be securely at home. !lopes and .fears, desires
and aversionD, ara e.s truly responses to tll.1ne;s
a.s a re !a1owing and t.11nking. Our affections.,
'l'1 he 1'1 t h e y a re onligh·~ened by understand1n5 ., are
orgru1s by ,i1 ioh we enter into the meaning of the
nab..lral norld as ge11u1nely as by lmoVJiDZ• ancl r1itt1

greater fullneas and intimacy.2

Dewoy hore indicates that natural man is firot of all a

cree.tUI"e of' emotional responses -- in terms of Do\",eyrs
defi11ition of emotional response.

T'nough this proposition

seems !ncon3r1.1oua with the general tenor of Dewey• s philosophic position., h e of'f'ers some substantiation for 1t.

\le need to recognize that the ordinary oonao iousne ss
of t h e ordinary- man left to himself 1s a creature of
desires rather than of intellectual s1.-u~., inquiry
or opeculation. Man ceases to be primal"ilY actuated
by hopes and fears, loves and hates. only when he
is subjected to a discipline which is foreign to
hurl19ll nature., which is., &:rom the standpoint of
natural man• artificial.~

2

Ibid • ., pp• 296-297 •·

3
John Dewey, Reconstruction 1n Phil.oso,eh.y (llew York:
Eenry- Holt and Coe., l920). P• 32e
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Dev,ey \'lill not subject emotion responses to valuecate~ories.

He loolte past emotion respo11aos beoause he

places the emphas1s on the response. 1n terms o~ a stimu.latin5 situa tio:11
. , n11d not on tiw bare emotion.
Emotions are conditioned by the incleterminatenesa of
presen t situations with respect to their issw,. Fear
and h ope . joy o.nd · eorrow, aversion and dos1re, as
port~1.rbations. are qualities of a divided response.
«rhey i n volve con oem, solicitude, ror v1ho.t t ho present
situat i on may become. •oare• signi.tieo tv,o quite
di fferent t h i ngs: fret, worry al'ld anxiety, and
ch.ez•ishing e.ttention that 1n whose potent1o.lit1ea
1.:1e o.ra :lnteras t od . Tllese two meanings represent
d1f£erent poles of reactive behavior to a present
ha,,:tng a f\1ture wh ich is ambiguous. Elation and
dopresaion, moreovor, ma.n1.teat the~solves only
undor c onditions ~herein not everything from
sta rt to .finish 1s oomplatel:, determined and
cer tuil1. T"ney way occur at a final momnt of
t~iumph or defeat, but this moment is one of' victory
or· :t'rt, atra tion i11 connection t11th a previous course o.t
tif'f'a1ra v;hose 1 soue was in suspense. Love .tor a
Be in,z s o perf ect a nd o om;plete t.11.at our regard for it
can make no d1.tferenoe to it is not so much a.tf'eot1on
as (a .fact wh ich t h e soholastias saw) it is conoem
f'or the destiny or our o\'lll sou1s. Hate that 1s
sh eer a nta5on1am without any element 0£ unoerta1nty
is l'lOt an emotion, but 1.s an onargy devoted to ruthle sa deatrt.1ot1011., Aversion is a state of a.tf'oot1vity
only 1n oonneot1on witl1 an obstruction offered by the
dis liked object or person to an end ma.de uncertain
by 1t.4
Regardlosa of the view t hat anyone talce s o.t emotion

responses, no one can avoid seeing t.~at 1n many instances

emotions literally pour over until they have 'become not a
guiding and directing agent. but a d1otat1ng and dominating
tyrant.

Nor does Dewey deny this.

4newey, quest .tor Certaintz, PP• 225-226.
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Tb.e natural mal"l dislikes the dis-eaao wh ioh accompanies t h e cloubt.f'ul and is ready to take almost any
mem~e to end 1t. Uncertainty is got rid of by fair
moans or f'ou1. L o11g exposure to danger breeds an
overpouerir.g love of security. Love for security.
translated into a deairo not to be disturbed and
unaettled. leads to do@n&tism• to acceptance of
bel3.e.fs upon authority-. to intolerance and fanat1cimn
on on e s i de end to irresponsible dependence and
slot h on the other.5
11thout a question Dewey feels t hat emotion responses are

value-neutral:, s.ncl b eine value-neutral t here simpl.J' is no
que stion of ~ood or evil that can poaoibly be connected to
t hem.

Since De»oy refiards the emotions and emotion responses

as havinG deve loped originally from instincts. e point he
mde ea1'"lier in t h is study'. this move is a broad step toward

~ip:ln~ t he nature of imn clean of taint of evil or g litter
of

eood . ne

i o neutral.

i:ven in the case of ohoioe. the consequences of vlh1oh

are unde oirable• t he intellect and emotions are not to be
held responsible or liable.
no liability e!tlwr.

force t hat resides

11

In fact. the nature of' man has

It is t :r..e will• a strange but potont

outo1de the porsan•" that must lJear all

ro,s ponsib1l1ty a..'"ld liability.
It is worth ghile to pause 1n our survey wh1le we
exardne more closely the JJature of choice 1n relation
to t h is allogod connection \11th i"ree will• free here
P.18aning unmotivated cbo1oe. Analysis does not
have to probe to t ile depths to discover t\,o faults
1n the t heory. It 1s a man. a human being in the
concrete. who 1s held responsible. If' tho aot doos
not proceed from the man• from the human being 1n

-

5

Ib1d • • pp• 227-228 •
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his con crete mo.ko-up of habits. desires and purposes,
why ab.ou1c1 ho be held liable and be punished! Will
appears as a roroe outside of the 1nd1v1dua1 person
as he actually is. a fbrce which 1s the real ultimate
cause or the act. Its freedom to make a choice
arbitrari l y t hus appears no around for holding t h e
human bei:rur; aa a concrete person responsible for
a 0 1oice. s

For t hat matter not even tho u111 can be held l.!able,
f or t he will does n o·t make altemat1ve selections.

\..- 'lat

it does do is to cla.r;tfy the situation by narrowing it down
a.~u defining it in terms recognizable and reooivable by the

:intel l i gence of t he s i tuat1011.

The task of resolving some

nituntio1u: is so broo.d and profound that t h e ultimate
r oaoll.t•cion ca nnot be value judged.
•·;e :ire .free in t h.e da g reo 1n which i7e act laiowing
nhat we a re about. Tl1e 1ndent1.f'1oation of freedom
n:i.th '.freedom of \-7111' locates contingency in the
:ron place. Contingency of will 1110u1d mean that
w1.ce r t a:i.nt y was W1ce1•tn1nty' dealt with; 1t ~,ou1d
l>e a resort to ohanoE> for a deo1s1cm. Tbe business
of' 'will' is to be resolute; that _. ia• to resolve.
undor t he GU,idanoe of thought. the indeterminateness
of uncertain situations. Ohoioe wavers and 1s
brougl.1t to a lieaa arbitrarily only when oiroumstanoes
001npel action and yet ,·,e have no 1ntG111gont clue
as to hov1 to act.
The doctrine of •:rree will' is a desperate attempt
to esoapo from the consequences of tbe doctrine of
fixed and immutable object !3eing. '.11th tho
dissipation oi" that dogma• the need for suoh a
measure of desperation vanishes. Preferential
activities on.araoterize over:, individual aa
individual or un1quo.7

6Jobn Dewey• Phllosom and 01v111aat1on (Now York:
"i1nton. P.aloh and Oo • • 10
• p. 273.
7De\"ley• guest for Oerta1n·::,;, pp. 249-960.
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In a vecy syotomat1c ancl J,rbP.ise manner Dewey bas dealt

'71th a.ll t.lJ.e periphera.1 arguments., and he has succeeded 1n
ma1nta1l'linB h ls position· -- p1"'ovided some concessions., men-

tioned in t h e preceding chapter., are mado.

ait eventually

t he 1•eade:i.• a11d the student of De\7ey oomos to the _point where
he a sks quite b luntly:
motivation s or acts?

:i.t

\"!hat about the basic drives or

Are t hey not value-oriented according

to t he de e:;ree of self-isl:mess or unself-1shness in the
individual?

Dewey' s reply 1s a ctually a return to the opening para-

s raphs

or

h is a.1•gument a s it is here recorded.

He say s t.."1.at

\'/hen dlsousa1n5 e::;1otion resp011sos · to oonrete situations., or
to situations recently made concrete by the nill 1 s resolution.,

t he dizcusaion concerns an area in which there 1s neither
self-!shness or wisel£-1shnesa., neither good nor evi1.
JI. co1•rect t heory of motivation shows that both

self-love and altruism are acquired dispositions.
not original ingrodients 1n O'i.U:' pqcholog1oal
make-up, and that eaoh.- ·of them may b e either
morally 500d or morally reprehensible.
Ps y chologicall)" speaking• 0\1r native 1mpu1ses
Sl".d aots are neither egoistic nor altruist1oJ
t hat 1sa they are not actuated by oonaoioua
regard for either one's ovm g ood or that of .
others. Tl1ay are rather direct responses to
situations.a

Let us digress for a moment and see ho\'I this would work

:ln a. sooial example.

'.Phe u.sual way for an 1nd1vidta.l to earn

8
John Deny and James Tufts., Ethics (Rev1aed edit1onJ
lfew York: UenZ'Y' Holt and Co • ., 1936). P• 324.
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a 11v:1n

:ta to a ppl.y himself 1n some form or V10rk whioh

bring s returna eit ho1• in the form of food or some valueollject that can b e traded for :food.

1a quite c o i'llOn to our soo:i.ety.

This labor ins titution

But suppose, and this too

is rather co1U1Uon., that some individual decided not to follo\T

t he pat tern of t na 1nst1tution and 1l1stead c oos out and robs
e.nd ki lls oth 01•s f'or hi s livelihood.

The thieving individu al.

is oo.pt-ured., i ,npr:i.soned and forced to work to provide a
living f'o1" i1:i.msol!' w:1.th :tn the prison.

Isn't t lle individual's

aversion to t he patt01"n of t he labor institution and the
induced con formanco t o the pattern ample evidence or the
quality-rating of t he 'natui•e of that indi vidual!
It is •natural' £or a otivit7 to be aBreoable. It
ten ds to i'i11d .fuli'illnient. and finding an outlet is
.itself' satia:f'actor;y., t or it marks partial o.ccomp lisb.mcmt , If' productive activity has beoome so ·
il'lhe1"e:ntly unsatisfactory that men have to be
arti:f'ioially- induced to engage in it• this f'aot
!s ample proof' t hat t h e conditions under mich the
work 1s carried on balk the complex activities instead
of promotina them, 1rr1tato and ~rustrate natural
ten dencies instead o.f' carrying t hem forward to
f'r1.1.ition . Work t hen becomes labor. the conseqicmoe
of some aboriginal curso which foroos man to :do what
he would not do if' he oou1d help it, the outcome
of s ome orig inal sin which excluded man rrom a
paradise. 1n whioh desire was satisfied without
industry. compellin5 h1m to pay .for the means of
l1vel1hood with the S\7eat of his brow. From v1hioh
it f'ollO\'l.ij naturally that Paradise ReGained means
t he aooumu.lation of investments euoh that a men
can live upon their return without labor. Thore is•
we repeat. too D111oh truth 1n this picture • .Eut it
is not a truth conoeming original human nature and
activ1 ty. It oonoorns the form human impulses have
taken und~r the influence of a apaoif1o social
env1rozll08nt. Ii' t here are difficulties 1n the way
of sooial alteration - as there oer'l;a1nl.v are -they do 11ot 110 1n an or1g1na1 aversion ot human
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nnture to oervioea.ble aot1or... but 1n the hiotoric
condit ions 'l"lhic h . ave differ entiated t ho work of
t he laborer f'.0 1" '7age fro m that of the a rtist.,
advent urer, spor t sman., soldier., administrator and
ape ou1a.t or.9
'!'ho Cl"'O\m:tns st a t eme11t" ,7hioh leaves no rooo .for re1>ly.

t h ough it carrie s little conviction., i s Dewey ' s high regard
for t ho

11

nout.ral." :nabl r e of man.

Ho matter h o\·; much eviden ce may be piled up a GS,in st
social. inst itut ions a o ~ ey exist., a.f.feot!on and
pa ssionate d e sire ~or justice and security are
real itie s in humru1 nature:,.10

In one pa s sage Dawey very conveniently places h is
phil o sopb:, :ln rel a tion to the thought that ha.a existed since
t ho boa inni.nz of tha world .

He is not so placing hi s entire

philoso phy., but only h i s position on the question o.f tb.e

nature of man in tel'lns 0£ 6 00d and evil •
. iis tor-3 s ee1ns t o e.r.h1b1t three stages or 1,;rom.h.
I11 the fir st sta3e, human relationships uera thought
to be so infectod with t he evils of corrunt hunan
nature a s to require redemption .from external and
super natural sources. In the next stage., \mat is
s 13nifi oa.nt iJ.1 t hese relationo 1s found to be
ak:ln to value s e steemed d1st1nct1vely relig ious .
ill.is is the· point n ow roached °h'.I liberal
t heologians. T'.ae third strAGO wou1d realize t hat
in .fact the values prized 1n those i,,11g1ons that
have elements are idenlizations o.f things characteristic of' natural assoo1at1ons which have thon been
p r ojected into a supernatural realm for saf'elc:eeping and sanotion.11

-------

9John Del.vey., Human Nature and Conduct (New Yorlc:
Henry Holt and Oo., J.92A), PP• is!-124.
10John De\7ey, A Common !-'a 1th (llew Havens Yale Un1vera1t1'

Press. 1934) 1 P• 79.
11I b1d., PP• 72-73.
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T".ne wh ole point of the previou s ref'erenoe 1s that 11'
accepted, it becomes tho 8 roundwork for the proposition that
The prob1em of evil ceases to be a theo1o·g1oa.1 and
metaphys1ca l one~ and is perceived to be the
practical problem of roduo1ng, alleviating! as
ftu, as nm:y be' removing, the evils 'oi' 11i'e. 2
Noti ce t h a t l 'lawey 11.Jls come around to the point nhere he
say s l.maba shed that t here are definito evils 1n the life

of man; con ver sel y t here i s also g oode

Dlt he has maneuvered

about t h e question so t llat he 1s able to approach it from a
side t hat :naltos the question of g ood and' evil not a sturabling
stone !'or h in1 but a stepping stone for the :further expansion
of 111.o ph.:.i.losophy.

·10 is now able to say that

Soc io.l condl tions rather then an old end unchangeable

Adam have generated wars; the ineradioable i mpulses
t hat a re utilized in them are capable of being
dra.!'tod into many othor cba.nnels-. 13

.

In the quotations that have been offered i'rom his
nriting s,:, Demey• s personal pos:I.t1on on tlm question of g ood

and evil 111 the nature of man has been presented.

De,.-,ey• a

position cm1 be pointed up more sharply 11' a few of his
antithetical sta tements are extracted for the sake of contrast.
Det7ey himself poses a question that baa long troubled

many philosophers.

If tho universe 1s 1n itself 1ctea.

rather than oonorete situation that requires an emotion

12.newel'°• Reoonstru.otion in Ph1losop1q, PP• 141-142.
13

nev,ey, H'WiJan Nature and Conduct, P• 113.
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responeo. ,'lay is it t hat Tie experience so

111110h 1n

the

universe t hnt i s completely unideal!
Attempts to ansv,or this question have always been
compell.ed to introduce a lapse from perfect Bains: -some k ind of i'all to which is duo the distinction
betwee11 :i.'lOtunena and phenomena., thing s as they ara
really a re and as t hey seem to ba. Th.ere are ma.ny
vers ions of' t.'1:ls doctrine. T"ne simplest, tholl8h
not t ho on e ~n11oh has most con1lliil!lnded itself to moat
philosophe rs., is the idea of tho 'fall of man•., a
£ 11 w 1ch., in t he \'10rds or Cardinal Uewman., has
i□pliouted all creation 1n an abor1g1lwl catastrophe. I run not oonoorned to discuss t hem and
t heir l."espective ueal:neoses and streng ths. It is
on ou( 1 to n ote t hat the philosophies \"/bioh g o by
tlle na ya of Idealism are attempts to prove by one
meth od or nnothe1"., oos1uolosical, ontological or
epiateinoloo1oal., that the Heal and tho Ideal are
one • r:h:i.le at tl'le s11me t :!i.m they introduce
(!Ualif-',fint; additions to explain why af'ter all
t lley ai•e not o e.14
I .f t h e .fall of mm1 1s a i'iotional construct r a ther

than a .factual rea l1tv., then. of course, any- doctrine of

anlva tion .for fallon ma111tind is also myth1oa1.

ho~ever., give somo slight 1nd1oat1on as
and W1.empirical doctrine came to bo.

to

Dewey does.

how t h is peculiar

Thia doctrine• even as

all hunJan behn.vior has a psyoholog1oal explanation of its
orig in.

All t he theories l7'.i.11oh put conversion •of the e'Y'B of
the aoul. 1 1n the place of a conversion of na.tura1
a11d social objects that modi.fies goods actually
experienced, 1a a rotreat and escape from ox1stenoe -and this retraction into self is., once more. the
heart of subjective eeo1ma. ~e typical examp1e is
perhaps the otherwor1dl1ness found 1n relig ions
whose ohiei' concern is ,d.th the oalvation of the
pereona1 soul. But otherwor1dl1ness is found as

1 4oewey. Quest for Certdnt7. P• 301.
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woll in e stheticism and in all seclusion within
ivory t owers .1~
In .fa ct ;, J)ewey is not oven convinced that the doctrine

of man 's natural oin.fulnoas is or131nal.

He feels that it

i s a c arry-over f rom t he very earliest days of ac1ent1f1o
inqui1,y.

'lhi .s ia n ot scient1.f1o inquiry as we know it.,. nor.

for t hat matter. d oea it ovon closely resemble o~r ·concept
of sc:i.enco .

Ra ther 1t was a carry-over from the first

stumbli11g days of an attempt to develop a so1ent1fio .method.
Por s cie11ce ., too, a t one t11ne, resorted to the ~pra.•natural
for cau sa l a xplana tions.

Ti.10 .si nfull1ess of r11an. tile corruption• of llia henrt•
h is ae l .t-love and love of power, v.lhen referred to as
causca are precisely of the same nature as was the
appea l t o a bstract poners (wh1ch 1n faot only re-

dupl i cated under a general name a multitude of
part i cular ef'fects) t l1at once prevailed 1n physica l
•ocience'~ and t he.t operated as a chief obstacle
to t he generations and growth of the latter.
Demons were once appealed to 1n order to expla 1n
b odi l y disease and no au.o h things as a strictly
11atu.1.,al dea t h \'Jas supposed to happen. The i mportation of general moral oausos to explain present
social. 12h onome11a is on t he aamo intelleotual
I ovei.16
Even if' evidence is presented to show man's sinful

0011dition. or ,·,hat may- be labeled s1n1'11, Dewey will not

aocopt t ho opnclueion t.'18.t man must have a supernatural
redeemer 1£ he is to be savod.

15Ib1d•• P• 275.
16Dewey, A Common Faith, PP• 77-78.
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The co11alusion (need for supernatural. redemption
because of corruption and sin) does not follow 0
however., f ro14 tho d ata. It ignores. 1n the first
pJa ca., t hat a ll the pos:l.tive values vh1.c h are prised,
anci :tn aid of' ·wh ich supernatural power 1s appealed
to, bave, after all, emerged from the v8'1!'9' scene
of hu.uw.n asaooiations 0£ which 1t is possi ble to
paint co bl a cl a picture.17
St i ll wh ere did men ever get the idea of evil in human
nat\ll"'e '?

If' Dewey is right. there mu.et have been some social

situa tion t hat p:rompted t h is faulty ,1111-resolution.

say s t h.era was.

Dewey

?.fan's idea of establishing morality --

mos t lil(el y 11'1 t h e sense of o. soo1al

l'JlOS

and sanction --

cave ri se t o t h ~ whole ~isW'lderstanding .

r.oral i t y is ·1a.rgely ooncerne.d w1 th controlling human
na tur e . 1}11011 wo are attempting to control anything
we are acutely aware of what resists us. So moralists
wer e led ., perhaps. to thin!~ of human na~ure as ev11
becausa o f i ts reluctance to 7i$ld to control~ its
rob a lliou.aneso under the yoke_.18
\'I it ll r e g.."'\.r cl to Dov;ey• a stater.ient, 1noral1ty and thD moralists

muat her e be tllougl1t 0£ as contributing elements 1n tho

earliest formation 0£ human soo1al o~gan1zat1on.
Experim1ce ha s taught us many thlngo, and EJome 0£ them

are not oxaotly desirable.

!.3Ut

the repetition and aas1m1lat1on

of' an experience. to tlle degree that it beoomes a habit, 1s
not to be regarded as. a man1.f'eatat1on of some innate and
na tu.ral oondition of our nature •

17Ib1d •• P• '14·•

18Dewey-, Human l.Jature and Conduct, PP• 1-2.
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Our self-love, our refusal to faoe faota. combined
perhaps with a sm~ae of a possible botter although
unreali zed sol!', lends us to eject tl'l8 habit f'rom
the t hou6ht o~ ourselves and oonoe1ve it as an evil
power t<rhich has someh ow overoome us. • • • These
traits of e. bad habit are preo1sely the things
wh 1oh a re moot :J.nstruotive about all habits and
about ourselvoa • • • • All habits are demands for
certain k ·i nda of activity; and they 0011stitute
t he self.l.9
If' self :ls the sum total of' ha.bite good and bad, and
they are "grouped" within us according to kind• a rational.

e xpl anation of human behavior and conduct is quite eimpJ.e.
ie errive at true oonceptions of' motivation and
interest Qn ly b y tbe recognition that selfhood
(eJ:oept as it ha s enoased itself 1n a shell of'
1,outine) is in p1•ooess of' making, and that any
self i a ca1,ablo of' including within itself a
nunlbor of' inconsistent selves. of' unharmonized
dispositions. Even a Nero may be capable upon
ooca oion of aato of kindnesa.20

t Dcmey • s repl y is actually bag5!ng a ·question.

For his

r epl y is appropriate only to a dogmatio statement that man
is entirely evil and that there 1s no one single bit of good
in manJ 11101"'e generally., that tho nature of man is f17..ed,

either good or ev:tl.

Dewoy continues 1n this vein by replying

to t h o proponents of a fixed and immutable nature. not to the
proponents of supernatural redemption.
lfu.e assertion that a proposed oban§e 1s impossible
because of the fixed oonst1tution of human nature
diverts attention from the question of whether

20Ibid •• P• 137.

53
or not a C!lang e 1a desirable and from the other
question of h o,, it shall be brought about. It
throv.1s lm.e question into the arena of bl.ind
emotion end brute force.Bl

The preoedil~g is t h e only reference found that addresses
itself' to t h e mutation of man's nature. and it simply a.rmues

in favor of t h e mutable as opposed to the 1mmu.table.
Apparently Dowey does not oonsidor it neoeasary to 51ve

ful.~ther atten tion to the question of' supernatural redemption
and mutation of the nat.'1ll'e of mm·i .

Dewey ~-i.dioa.tes this

situe:t1on by de cla ring that
The t i me may be te.r off when men will cease to f'ul:f111
t hoir nee d f o1~ combat by destroyJ11g each ot..11.er and
\'h:1en they v;ill manif'est it 1n common and ooinbined
effor ts a g a inst t h o £orces that are enemieo of' all
:111en equally. Bu.t the diffioult1os in the nay ara
r ound 1n the persistence of certain acquired social
cus toms and not in the unchangeability of the demand
f or oombat.
Pugnacity ancl i'efl.l' are native elemsnts of' htunan
nature. nut so are p ity and sympath.1'• \'l o aend
nurses and physicians to the battlefields and provide hospi tal f'ao111ties as •naturally' as we
change bayone ts and. discharge machine guna.,2 2

As noted 1n the opening paragraph of this chaptor. the
philosophy of John Dewey does not have room f'or a t h reshing
out of the que.stion of good and evil.

The question is• at

bost, irrelevant, if' not non-existent.

Dewer has laid all

21
John Dewey, Problems .o f Il1en (New Yorks
Library~ 1946), P• J.92.
22

Ibid., P• 187.
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his stress upon habit formation and the function of these
habits.
AGain the ques tion is asked what are the consequences
of Dewey- 1 s f'o r m1.11at1ona.

Opinion :ts l"a.t b.er sharply divided.

, S.d."loy Hoo"' f'oeJ.s t hat

po~mt ing to t he pervasiveness of habits and
t neir h i s torical char acter, Dewey is able to cut tho
grov.nd .from uncler the hoary but still very nn1oh alive
bel ief' in the unalterabil.ity of' human nature. The
£act s oT heredi t y by what they are, changes in social
conditio11s wiJ..l produce t h ose changes 1n men v,hich are
social and morally si5n1f1oant. It is in 20cial and
moral ter s t hat huma.11 nature is alVlays construed,
especinlly by t h ose most convinced of its fix1t-y.,
••• t le natural endowment of man sh ows at most a
capacity f'or violent a.otion. \'Jb.ether the capacity
e1q1r0sae s i tself in shedding blood according to
cert ain 1,uJ.es or in en.y of' W1111wu James r moral
equivalents o~ war depends upon the set o:r habits
·w:.1ich obtains in a cultt\re• and upon the historical
cont ext 0£ those habits. war 1s thus seen to be a
function or social institutions, not ot Ylhat is
native1y fixed 1n human constitutions.23
Dy

att t hen wh y d o('o an 1nst1 tution such ns \lar persist; why

do men permit it?

Reinhold Niebuhr is of' the opinion that

Dewey !s in fact less conscious of' the social per ils
of ael:f-love than e ither Locke or Hume. In his
thought t h e hope of achieving a vantage point \'/aioh
transcends the corruptions of salt-interest takes
the form of trusting the 'aoient1f'1o method' and
attributing anti-social conduct to the 'cultural
lag ', that is, to t he £a11ure of social science
to keep abreast with tecbnoloay. •That coercion and
oppression on a large scale ex1at no honest person
can deny,' he declaros. ' Bu.t tlleae tllinga are not
the p1"oduct of science and technology but of the
perpetuation 0£ old 1nst~tut1ons and patterns

(rt &\7

23
·
Sidnoy liook, John Dewel an Intelleotual Portrait
York: John Day co.. 1§! )• pp. mo-Di.
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untol\Ched by t h e soientif'io r.iethod • . T11e inf"erenoe to
be d 1'e.vm i s clear.' The failure of the past and
p1'e sent aro due to t h e fact that the scientific
method ' has not been tried at any time with use of
all t he r eaources ~'hich acientif"ic material and the
e;.:periment a l mQthoO. n ow put at our disposai.,24
Sic.m ay Hook i s obviou sly of" the opinion that the

sci enti f i c me t hod c an accomplish a raform tion and redirection
of humm1

ll9. t 1.1 re •

But • ,e inhold Uie bu.hr does not a Gree~ and he

0£.fer s t his c om:ne11.t on Dc:ney• s attitude toward t h e scienti.fic
meth od.

P1...oi'e ssor Dew.e y has a touob1ng fa1 th in the
possib ili t y o~ a.cld ev1l1.g the same results i :i.' l the
.fi old 0 £ social X'elat io11s which 1ntolligence achieved
:i.n tho ma s t ery of nature. The fact that man constit utionally corrupt s h is purest visi011s of disinterested
ju tice in his act tte.l actions seems no·v or to occur to
him. , Con sequen tly he never \"lea.r1es in loolcing for
spe cific cause s of interested rather t han disinterested

a c t i on . As an educator:, one or bis favourite theories
is t ha t nia.TJ. ' s be t1'11yo.l of h is O\'l'l ideals in action 1s

due to ~aulty educational techniques which separate
1 ·i';lleory and practioe., thought and action •.'
He thL,ka
t his fsulty pedagogy is derived from the 1 trad1t1ona.l
separat ion o:r mind a nd b ody• in idealistic philosophy.
In common ~ith his eie;hteenth-oentuey precursors. he
would uaa t h e disil'ltei•ested .force o:r his 'freed
intelligen ce• to a ttack institutional 1njustioes and
t hus further free il1telligence. Despotic institutions
represent 1 rel.ationoh1ps fixed 1n a pre-scientific age•
m1d are the bulwark or anaollron1st1c social attitudes.
On t he other hand 'lag in mento.l and moml patterns
provide tb.e bulwark o:r tho older mstitutions' .25

24Rainhold Niebulu'• Tha Nature and Dest~ of Man
(Mev, Yorlc: Scribner• s Sons. i9S!j., f. iio. ~ e inner
quotations a.re .from Dewey. L1boral1sm and Social Action,
P• 82.

OlIAPTSR VII
THE Il..'\'l1URE OF !LUT I IJ Tfi.!Ri.iS OF LiORALS AlID UORL'. LIT!l

At first c;lanoe i t appears that there 1s only a fine

l:ll1e 11 if'

a11y:,

bet\1ee11 the sub ject area of t h is chapter and

t hat of t ho precedi ng.

i3Ut t h is distinction has been made

int entiona lly f or the sake of comprehension and also of

integr ated organiza t ion .

Th.is 1s a slightly shorter chapter

t han t he pr e ceding and it will attempt to localize Doney 's
princi ples a~ they ware exhibited in sn extended fa ~ion
0

0110 oth e11 note ought to b e made.

In t h is chapter t he

focus i~ on mo~ul a and mora lity a3 Dewey defines them.

Unf'o~tWlBt ely Dowey never prin ted h is own personal definition
of morals and morality :, bu.t from t11e material examined thus

r ar it appea~s that f or Dewey morals are not traditional
f ormul a t i on s o~ soci al sanction, nor aro they supematural
l aws of behavior t h at 1uen have received by revelo. t1on, nor

are t hey t he end product of a philosophical system•
.Jarjorie Or ene oolillncmts on Dev1ey•s position 1n this fashion.
f'ter a :fine, •sc1ent1f1o, 1 1 tough•m1nded 1 account of
dewoci"ati c man• s 1iberation from false traditional
moralities t h ere always comes, 1n Dewey and his
followers, a point a t which one suddenly f1ndo that
with t he elimination of rol1g1ous superstition and
metaphysical i e;norai'loe, new values or even old
ones havo been spontaneoual~ generated out of the
bedroolt of faot and more faot. • ••and at that point
pragmatism itself succumbs to a delusion at least
ao grievous as those b:, TJhioh Hegel• a pure speoulanta
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deceived t he maelvesJ for mere f'aota will never to
all ete1""nity a onerate values; nor can aoienoe -psycholoror a s ~ell as iuclear phya1os -- by itself

~ene rate 60od or evil.

The difi'icu lty i ndicated in the above quotation t11ll become

more and more apparent as we proceed.

In the face o~ t his

par adox tho t erm "· ora.1s 11 will still 'be used for ti.le sake

of' the common 1.u1dersta1'ld in~ of the general reader.
Previously Dowey r e jected the idoa of an i mrnutab le
;;1atur0 of'

.1.~.,

and., be ing consistent. he indicated that the

consequences of tl'li s doctrine of the immutable nature are
i'l"Ui t l e ss •

'I'he •i ..!oory of i'i xed ends inevi tabl.7 leads t h o~ht
into 'Gho bot,;i; of' disputes th~t cannot be sett1ed.
If thor·e is one awmuum bonwn. one supreme end,
v,hat is i t 'Z To consi der this problem is to place
ourselveo in t h e midst of controversies that are
e.s a ou te now as t h ey were t\VO thousand years ago .2

.,.,oy•a

.formulatioll of raorals a11d moral.tty is not baaed on

£ixed en ds., a aupreme good or eternal verities.

Tlle naole of newey•s philosophy-, espeo1al1y bis

epistemology., is concerned wittl the problem of means and
ends o.s con sequence a of the means •

In the area of morals,

too., he is con cerned \'11th tllis relationship.

As Dev1ey puts

it,

1.t.1arjor1e Grene., Dreadful Freedom (Ch1oago:
of Ch icago Press., 1948)., PP• 9-10.

university

2
John De\ley., Reoonstruot1on 1n Ph1losopb.y (lrew York:
Heney :Holt and Co •• l.920J, P• J.34.
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Desire belongs to tho 1ntrins1o nature of manJ
we cannot conceive a human bein6 mo does not have
\"/ants., needs., nor one to v1hom i'ulfill.mont of desire
does not arford satisfaction. As soon as t he poner
of t h ou€):l.t devel.op s. needs cease to be blind; t h ou(;h.t

looks ahead and foresees results. In rorms purposes,
plane., a i ms. end-in-view~ Out or t hese un1veraal
and inevitable f a ct s of human nature t here necessa rily ..,ro1.•1 t h e moral conceptions of the Good, and
o:r the value of the intelleat\.ml phaso of character.,
wh ich mn id a ll t h e conflict of desires and aims
striveo .for insigh t; into t he inclusive and enduring satisfacti on : wisdom. prudenoe.3
Notice t llat

ne,·,e;, e.ocepta and deals with man as he finds

h i m., without in any way idealizing him.

Bllt at the same

time De,·;ey 1noerts tho intellect or intelligence of the
individua l a s a determining factor.
upon

11

T'ais atrong relianoe

t h e i 11tellectual phase o·f cbaracter11 is :f'ound t h rough-

out Dewey • s philo sop~.

As indica ted earlier in this paper. social interaction
i s all•:i. 1portant in a con sideration of any segment of Dewey's
philosophy .

llere too it plo.ys an important part.

At t h e

sar.-ie time :Lr1 wh ich t..lie 1nc1:7.v1dual is developing a sot of
"morals" f or h:i. self• ho 1s acting with and upon other

inc.11vi duals in the social situation.

There results a literal

a1ve and t ake of thought, action and aocopted pattern of'
behavior.

It ia .from this interaction with t.l ie conaequont

of accepted and approvable patterns of action that Dewey

develops h is idea of mornls ond morality.

"I!

.:>John Dewey and Jamos Tufts, Ethics (Revised ed1t1onJ
l'lew York: rlenry Holt and co •• 1936), P• 343.
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Eu.man beings approve and disapprove. sympathize and
r e sent , a s naturally and inevitably as they seek for
t he objects they ,1a11t• ll.&"'ld as they impose cla1'1i1s and
respond to them. Thus the moral Good presents
itself neither merely as that which satisf'1es desire•
nor as t hat which fulfills obl.1gat1on. but as that
which is ,!RP.rovabl.e. From out of the mass or
phenomena oi!tn1 a sort t here emGrge the generalized
ides.a oi' Virt1.1e or Jora.l Excellence and of a
ntando.rd which regula tes the manifestation of
approval and d iaapp~oval, praise and blame.4
Dewey' s position 3.s illustrated by- the manner in nhich
a body of' morals, or mo;;:aal1ty 0 develops.

Morality did not

develop overnight or with the issuing of a single set of
edicts.

Uol"al:tty came about through a l.011g and stil.l con-

t :lnui11~ procoss of posit• test, aajust and approve.

I nquiry~ discovery teke the samo place in morals
t h~t t h ey have coma to occupy 1n soioncea of 1mture.
Validation. domonstration become experimental., a
tte1" oi' oonsaquenoes. lteaaon., always an honorif'io
term in ethioa., becomes a.otu.."1.lized 1n the methods
by which t ho needs and conditions. the obstacles
a..':'l.d r-osources of situations are scru.t1nized L,
detail., a.':'J.d intelliBent plans of iniprovement are
worked out.5

This p rogram of' aotion has not al1,1ays been carried ot1.t
in social life., and because it hes not been put into operation,
The need L"'l morals is for speoli'1c methods of' inquiry
and of' contrivances ~ethods of inquiry to locate
d ifficulties and evils; methods of· contrivance to
i'orm p lans to be used as workinl; hypotlloses in dealing
with them. And the pragmatic import of' the logio
0£ :i.."'ld ividl1alized situations. each having its own
irreplaceable good and principles, is to transfer

Loo.
-

4

cit.

5nevey. Reoonstru.ction 1n Philosophy. PP• 139-140.
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t he attention of theory from preoccupation with
general con cep tions to the problem of develop:Ing
e~~ective me t h od s of inquiry.6

\ihen Dewey re:f'e1•s to "ind ividualized oituat1onai, each having
its m·111 irrepl a ceable good and principles," he is sim!)l.J'

notinc; t ha.t all n1orals and moral.1ty are relo.tive to t h e

immediate o:i.tuat io11 with its consequoncoa.

It is insuf'•

f'iciont to say t hat Dei:1ey' s etb1ca and morality !'all into

t he broad c a tes ory of relativism, for he adds t he slightly
quali~YinG clause of t he consequences.
aeqi1.onoes

e.1"0

Since t h ese con-

realized 1n progressive soo~l situ.ations.:i

and a ll social sit uation s a re to a greater or lesser degree

inter-rela ted., a 1:,o dy of morals is l>uil.t up.

oouy of

However., tb.1s

mora ls is still dependent upon t he individualized

situat ion ~1ith its cons equences.

Dewey indicates h1a

desire

to place t h e empha sis here rathor tha11 on the development ar

a body 0£ s eneralized morals in the l.ast half of the last
sentence o~ the quotation.
Still not every s ocial. situation ia a -moral situation.

A moral s itua t i on is one in uhioh judgment and
ch o i ce are required antecedently to overt aot1on.
The practical meaning of the situation -- that
is to say t he action noeded 1x> satisfy it ... is
not self'-ov1dent. It has to be searched .for.
There ai•e oonflloting desires and alternat 1ve
apparent goods. ~·:hat is needed is to find the
right 001.:rse of action. the ril#lt c;ood. 7

6 Ib1d., PP• 136-137.
7 Ib1d., P• 133.
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over e period of time eome socia1 situations Ql'ld t heir
reopo11sa o b eoon10 s o f:l.rmly established that there is no

judgment 02.'" cho ae required.

s\. n

example• perhaps, would be

t he 1nt1..ocluctio11 of trio etranr;e men to ea.o..'1 otllor.

It is

qu:i.to \"1ell eHtablished t h at t he t\'lo will speak sor.1e brief

greetine; and s h ake hands.

Mo amount o.f ju.dgmont or do:-

li'be1•a.tive c ho i ce are l'equirod be.fore the tv,o respond to
eaoh oth er a.."l'ld to t h e s ocial s11..-u.ation.

However, 1f the

si t uation required t llat t rae individuals involved think over
and eva l uate t lle s1'tuo.t1on, ~ncl t h en deoide upon a course o.f
act ion -- ,·,1t h due consideration to t h e consequences --, t hat
woul d iJe a moral situation.

The i mplioations of the pl'ovious parae raph are that
111orals exi st only when a moral situation exists.
true even t h ou g...'1 an individual

111

This is

the h istory of his ex-

perience can r eoall other similar moral s1t.-uat1ons and his
responses.

'!hore is no sucl'l thing as apply:i.ng your moral

oxpe r1cmco to t he immediate moral a1tuatlon mid mechan1ca1ly
seleotinr:; a response.

.!\t best moral experience oan be used

to aid t he intellect 1n 1 ts delibem tion tov,ard makins an

existential choice.
llioral goods and e11ds exist only v,hen som.othing has
to be done. The fact that something has to be
dor1e pl"OVEJE that tho-r e are de.f1o1enoes, evils in

the existent situation. This 111 is just the so eo1f1o
111 that it 1s. It never is an exaot duplicate- of
anythinc; else. Consequently the good of the
situation has to be disooverod, projected and
attained on t.."le basis of tile exaot defect and
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trouble to be rectified. It oannot 1ntell1Z!ntl7
be i n jected into the situation from without.a

If th i s is t he case, t he only thing that we can say
a.bout mor als t hat is g onerally applicable is that
! "1de sympath y. k een sans:lt1ver1ess, pera1stenaa in

t he i'ace or t he d isagreeable. balanoe of interests
enablln i: u s ·to undot•talce the ,~ork of analysis and
decision i ntelligently are the d1st1not1vely mora1
t r•a 1te -- t he v1:t,tues or moral exoellenoies.9

•·1e mention e d ea rlier that Dewey- discards the doctrine

of 'eternal verities, ai~d 1n so doing he is oi' t.~e opinion
t h a t tb.e loss i s i nsi8l'l1ficant in the limht of the g ains

made t b 1"oueh t he u se of the so1ent1f1c method.
In t h e end, loss of eternal truths was more than
componsa ted i'or in the accession of quotidian facts.
~'l.l.E> loss of the ayste1u of superior and fixed definition s o.n d k :lndo ,,aa more tllan made up for by the
growir1a system of hypotheses and lo.ws used in

claasify ir15 i'acts. Afte1• all. thon• we aro only
ploa.d1ng for tlle adoption 1n moral retleotion of
the logia tho.t has been proved to aake for security,
st1,1nae11cy and .fertility- in passing judgme11t upon
physical phenomena.. And the reason 1s the same.
The old method in spite of its nominal and esthet1a
worsh ip of reason discouraged reason, beoause it
h i ndered t l1e operation of scrupu1ous and unrend.tting
inq.i iry .10

T'nis does not mean, however. that therE> no lone er is
any t h ing t..'.-iat owi be labelod true.

8

£.2.!5! ••

p. 136 •

9
Ibid•• P• 133.

lOibid • ., PP• l33-U4.

It is rather a
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d1st111ot1on 1n t he mathod of determining what things a1"e
true.

I t has t aken some tiiue but

In physica l matters men have alowly F:,l'Own accustomed
in e ll spec if';i.c l:>alie .fs to ident1fy111g t he true w1 tll
t he ver:.t.f:teri.J.l.

T'ne a tt1t uc1e t l'la. t t ~e true 1s the verified oan easily be
carried over into the area of morals and morality.

However,

i t will mean., a ccordine to ne,1ey, that sor.1e thinSs t h at have
at taine d status by virtue of a ge or tbat have been taken for
gi~u11t ed wil l have to pass t he acid teat o.f verif'ioa tion

t hrough t b.e EJcient1f'ic method.

Othel'\1ise t hey w1l.l be

discarded .
To oneralize- t he recognition that the true ineana
t ne v erified a nd tilam1e noth ing else plaoes upon men
t he respons ibility for surrend0ril1g pol1t1oal a11d
moral dogme.s:, and subjeot111g to the test of' aonacquonce s their most cherished prejud1oes.12
On tho basis

or

h1personal loe io, even thouBh it 1s

appl ied t o personal s ituations~ Dewey's position a ppe~rs
quite s ound .

Horiover. ono telling objection can be raised,

t1h:tch nullif':tes inost of imat Dewey has so carefully con-

structed .

As Boyer points out,

ihe modem so1ent1rio philosophers suoh as John
Stuart ?!111 and Jobn Dewey may emphasize a morality
based on the idea of progress, sinoe they view the
la we of' nature as impersone.1 but neverthele as

11
Ibid., P• 130.

-

12
Ib1d., P• 131.
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amenable to man's desires.13
This lapsa dialectics. cam1ot be passed by.

'l'ho idea o~

procresa and t be nm1able ohnracter .of the la~s of nature are
• somoth:lr1g t hat is .frequently 1'ound in :le.stern ph1losoph1c

t holl8h -- i t might almost be oaid that it is peculiar to
Vcstorn t hoUGb,t.

But even as t..~e pbysi ooratio theory was

t ho crux of: t .. o eni;il'"e classical tradition., 1n economics.

so :tn t h is instance De\1ey' a entire structure stands or falls
on the c;ranting o:r denyinz of one assumption.

13
uerle Boyer! H1f1wgs of Philosoph;y; (Philadelphia:
l.t"uhlenberg Press• 949 , P• l.20e

CHAP!l'ER VIII
THE llii. TORE OF i,;ilM I l

Timrs .OP CO:trSEQU.E:ltT LIVDiG

In this .final c hapter m1der the g eneral head:lng of

The Na t ure o.f f,Tan t he prino1plea t.liat have been exam1n8d
t hu s !'ar will be projected into the realm of sooietal living .
Dewey hims e l f' was stro11gly oon.cerned 111th the consequences

of any a ct., and to e.:r.ten d the formulation to include the

con saquonces ts to f'ol low Dawey •s ov n pattemi.
Uef'ors t he oot1sequenoes are studied. h owever, a glance

ougl1t t o b e 51ven once a Bain to the cauaat1vo factor behind
con aoquences., and t hen v iew the conseep.tences in the light
01" the c au sation .
T'ne d octr i n e t hat t h e ohie.f ~ood o~ mm1 is g ood will
ou.stly \7i11s acoeptm:1.oe from honest men. For cozmuonsense e pl oys a juster psyol1oloey· than eithor of the
t heol"i es juEt mentioned. By \7111~ common-sense under::,tand a s ome t h i ng l>l''actioal and movine; • It understands
t he body or habits, of active dispositions ~h1ch makes
a man do wh at he does. V,'111 1 s thus. not something
opposed to consequenoes or severed from them. It is a
cause of oonsequencosJ it 1s causation 1n its personal
aspect. t ho aspect immediately preooding action • • • •
For a disposition .nenns a. tendency to aot, a potential
ener gy needin& only opportunity to become k il1etic and
overt. hpart from suoh tendency a 1 v1rtuous 1 disposition is e1tl~or hypocrisy or self-deoe1t.l

Cons equences and consequent living is• then. t h e end
product of the action of an individual who 1s acting o.ocording
1 John Dewey. Human .i:Jature and Oonduot (New York:
Henry Holt and Co •• 1922), P• 44e
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to the body of' habits or d1spos1ti01.-is ti-lat he b.as built up
t brouuh. suocess :i.ve e,i:perienoe.

But at the samo t1mo there

mu.st be sor. e .field wit hin ,·m.1oh these d1spos1t1one and

habits funotj.on overtly.

The total env1romnent EUI"round:l.ng

t he a.ct .ng i ndividual sarves e.s the f'ield or 6l'OUnd for the
actiOi.'le

Con sequencea depend upon an intsraotion of 't'loat he
s t a rts to per.f'ornt witll his env.1ronmE>nt~ so he must
tak e t ho l atter into e.ocow1"• lio one can f'oresee
a ll con se quences because no one oan be ai'7B.I'e of all
t he conditions that enter ~1to their production.
, ory person builds bettor or worse than he knows.
Good f ort une or the favorable co-operation of
·
onvironmel'lt ia s1;111 necessary. Even VJith hie b est
thcuf;ht . a me.n's propoaed course of action may be
defeated . Bu.tin as far e.E his aot is truly a mani- •
fa ste.tion or intellig ent choice. ho learns something:
a s in a ~cienti fio eitpor11nent :m 1nqu1rel' 'lr.'18.Y' learn.
t !l..rou5ll h i s exper:1.mc:m.tation• his intelligently
directed action. quite aa mu.oh or even more i'r01n a
failure than .from a success. lie finds out at least
a little as to what was the matter vlth his prior
choicee Re ca.a., choo se better end do better next
time ; 'beter choice' meaning one better co-ordinated
with t he conditions ti1at a.1"e involved 1n realizing
purpose • . Such control or power 1s never complete;
luck or .fo rtune. t he propitious support of circumstances not foreseeable is always involved. But at
lea.at su.ch a person forms the habit of choooin5 and
acting with con scious regard to the grain of circumstances. the run of affairs. And what is more
to tho point• such a man beaoD1E>a able to turn
frustration and f'a1llll'e to account 1n his further
ch oices and purposes.2

Uowey 1 s presentation of tho place of consequences 1n life is
completely consistent with his principles of choice and

2

John Dewey• Philosom and Civilization (New York:
Minton. Ba.loll. and co.• 193 • pp. 288-287 •
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selection tl~at were quoted earlier.
1n t he

1

B-~t not1oe that · right

id.st o~ h ia extended argument he introduces the faotor

of "goocl r o1"'tuna. 11

Tho obvious in!'orenoe ia that Dewey him-

self felt the dif£1culty, perhap s even the 1mposs1b111ty, of

determining b roadly t he 0011sequenoes on the basis of' the
habit-cho1oes made.
Though. h e reco!!ll:i.zes oerta1n .forces that are beyo11.d tho

control or man, Dewey 1e oaref'ul to state that these forces
can., in pw."t, bo broUlY,'lt into control,

01"

at least that man

be able to predict t he action and reaction of thase forces.
This is so:net· i ng tb.a.t pritait1ve man with lesser i n tellectual

a.tts.imnen·i; \7as l'lot able to do.
There ca11 be no doubt · or 01.1.r dependence upon forces
Primitive man was so ~npotent 1n
t h e face of t hose forces that, eapeoially in an unfavorable natural environment, fear became a dominant
t\ttitude , a.ru:1, as t he old say:tng goes, f'ear created
t he c;ods.

beyond our control.

meohan1sms of control- the element of
fear ba o., :r•ela.tively spealcins , subsided. ~3ome opt1miat1o souls have oven concluded the forces about ua
are on t he \'laole essentially benign~ Ellt every or1s1s,
whether of the il1di:vidual or of the community, reminds
man or the precarious and partial nature of tbe control
he exercises.
.then man., individually and oolleot1vel.y,
has done hie uttermost, conditions tllat at d1fi'erent
tmes and places havo 3 1ven rise to the ideas of Fate
and Fortune., of' Chance and Providence., remain. :rt is
the part of' mmil111ess to insist upon the oapao1ty o.f
mankil~d to strive to d1reot natural and social f'oroea
to humane e11ds. Jlut unqual11'1od absolut1st1o statements about the onm1potenoe of suoh endeavors refleot
egoism rather than intelligent oouraae.3
t iit h incr ease 0£

3 John Dewey, A OODIDOD Faith (?Jew Havens

University Press, J.934), PP•

e4-as.
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In spite or man • s continued dif'f'ioulty and even failure 1n

controllinS theao outaide f'oraes. Dewey still insists that
it :ta a part of ma1'llineos tl't.at man has the capacity to

strive with t hese f orces and bring them into subjection f'or
the sake of' "humane ends."
In another inst a....-ice Dewey did not speak nearly so
optimistically about rnan •s consequential. relationship to

t he se out~ido f orces beyond man•o control.
~ortune rat hor t han our own intent and act determines
event;ual success ancl f'a1lU%'e. The pathos of: unful-

filled expectation~ 't.~e tragedy of defeated purpose

and id.eals.:., the catastrophes of aoaident, are the
collnonpl a cos of' all comment on the human scene.
·:1e survey conditions, make the \Yisest choice we
can; Tie act~ a1'ld l'Je lllUSt trust the rest to fate,

f ortune or providenoe.4

Dev,oy is he1"e takll1g a f'ar more realistic view of' oonsequonoea,
as they appear in h is structure of' thou,311.t, than he did 1n

t he ca1"lier quotation from him.

Hor,ever, Dewey 1s net ready

to admit that because fate and fortune frequently BOVeni our
aotivity 0 by determining consequences, we must pattern our
~ctivity a cpord1ng to an established plan, nhioh itself baa

boen dratm up from a vast amount of expm-ience nith f'ate
and fortune.
The fact that human destiny is so intol'\'loven w1 th
£orces beyond hwnan control renders it unneoes&al'J'
to suppose that dependence and u~e humility that
accom_panies it havo to f'1nd tho particular channel

4 John Dewey, ;;ueat for Carta1ntJ (lfew York;

Ba.loh and Oo •• 1.9)• P•

7.

lJ1nton,
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that i s presoribed by traditional dootrinea • • • •
Foi" 0 1.u " depend.e nce 1s 1uanifested 1n tllose relations
to t he ei1v!ronmont that support our undertakings
a.,,,d e. sp il"a.tions as muoh as it is in the defeats
inflicted upon us.5

To Dewey much of the dependence upon these outside
foroea is an h istorical fact. something that existed powerfully in t he day s o f p r:1m1t1ve man. but since that time it
i s slowly bei ng overcome.

This being the situation, accordin5

t o Dewey ,, men ousht to strive with greatep oners:, to establish
t he scientific meth od

or

acting.

I t wou l d b e p ossible to argue (and,, I think, t'11th mu.ob.

justice) t!lat failure to make action oentl'a.l 1.~ tho
sea.roll f or suah security as !a humanly possibl.!3 is a
sui"v i val or t he i mpotency of raen in those stages of
ci vili zation when he had few moans of.' regulnt1ng and
utili z ing t he condit19ns upon which the ocourance of
oon seque1:1.ces depend. AB long as man was unable by
means or tho arts of oractice to direct the course
of eventa. it VlllS na tural for him to seek a n e motional
substitute; 1n the aosenoe of actual certainty in the
.1ni d at of' a precarious and hazardous world, mon
cultivated all sorta or tb1l1gs that would give them
t lle .reeling or certainty. And it is possible that•
wllen not carriod to an illusory point, the cul.tivation
of t he .f'eeli..Tlg gave man courase and confidence and
enabled him to carry the burdens of life more
auccessfully.G
It is at this point that Dewy can very suocess.ful.1¥

enter h is p1•ev1ous formulation concerning GOOd and evil,
fixad and flexible enda~

This is not to aay that it 1a

logically permissible~ for 1t baa previously been shown that

6

Ib1d., P• 25.

6Dewey, guest for Oerta1ntJ, P• 33.
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there are severe sh ortoomin{',s 1n Dewe7 1 s fonmlation.

Int if t he pr actice of lettinG Dewey speak £or himself 1s
mai n tained., h e wou ld at this point, by using a pr1noip1e

established earlier, be able to solve tile problem of consequences and £a te.
In any case, h owever., arguments about pessimism and
opt imi sm ba s ed upon considerations regarding fiXed
a.ttainme1'lt of good and evil are mainly literary 1n
quality . i:!an cont:Inues to live because he is a
living 01..el\ture not beoauoo r eason convinces him of
t he cert ainty or probability of futw:-e satisfactions
t hat carr y h i m on. He 1a instinct with activi ties
t h.at carry lliJn 011. J.ncliv iduals here and there cave
in• ·:id niost indiv i duals sag , v1:i.thdraw and seek:
l"ei'uge a:c t h.is a11d t hat p o int. :Sut man aa man
stil l has the dumb pluck or the animal. He has
endu~anoe., hope , cur i osity., ea gerness, love of

a ct ion . Ti1a ae tl"o.~.t o b elong to him b y struot u.re.,
no t ll"J t alting t llour;ht. n or.iory of past ai1d f'ore31ght of .future convert dumbness to some degree
of artioulatenosss 'Thoy illumine curiosity and
st oady couraf;e. Then when the .future arrives uith
its inevitablo diooppointmel'lts as \1911 as f'ul•
f illnionts, and wi t h new sources of' trouble.

f a ilure lo ses s anoth1n~ of its fatality, and
sui'f'e ring yield fruit of' -:lnstruotion not of'
bitterness . Humility is more demanded at our
mon1ents of tr1wnph t han at those of failure.
For humility is not a oadd1sb. self'-deproo1at1on.
I t is t he sense of our slight 1nab111t~ even with
our be st iutelligonoe and effort to ooumumd eventaJ
a aense of our depondenoe upon f'oroes that go their
way tvithout our wish and plan,. 7
Dowey points out that JllllOh thinking about man and his

poss1b111t1ea has been f'osgod by pre-oonoept1ona regardinE;
t he nature of man.

In a series of three quotations Devey•a

position on the question of' consequent living will be shown.

- ·- -----7

Dewe7, Human Nature and aonduot. P• SB9.
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Once a gain he pla ces mo.n 1n the realm of the relative.
r.ian I s nature has been regarded with suspicion• with
fear., ,·,1t h aour look s• sometimes '11th enthusiasm for
its po ssibili t ies but only \vhen these were pl.t'.ced in
con t r act \'11th 1ta n.otual1ties. It hlls appeared to
b e so e villy d isp osed tllat the business of moral.1ty
was to prune a11d ou1"b itJ :'i:t ,•,ould be t h ottSht botter
o!.' i f i t cou l d b e replaced by so1!lethin8 else. It haa
boen sup, osed t hat mor ali ty would be quite superfluous \'IEU"'e it 11ot for t h e inherent weakness. border ing
on de prav i ty., of human nature. Some \."ll'ite~s ,Yith a
m01"e geni a l c oncep tion h ave attributed the ourron t
bl a ck ening to theolog ians who h.9.ve t h o~ht t o h onor
tho divi11e by d1sparag it15 t he human.a
According t o De ·,ey t he oe thoo1og 1ans and tho rol1Gion s t hey

r e_ r e sent a c tually have no battle with science -- provided
t h ey

01•0

will inc to view man through tho g la.sse a of t h e

scien tifi c 1ethod.

uolig ious .fa i ths have come under the :tnf'luence of
phtlosophi e s that have tried to demonstrate t he f'ixecl.
un - on or t he act ual and i deal in ultima.te Bein .
1heil• i11terost m persuading to a life of loy-o.lty to
r1ha.t i a o steemed 300d. h as been boWld up with a certain
creed r ega r ding h i s tor1oa1 origins. Relieion has also
been involved 1n t he motaphy-sias of substance. and has
t hrown 1n its lot with aooeptanoe of' certain cosmogonies.
I t ha s .round itself i'i§hting a battle a.nd a losi115 one
wi t h. science., as 1r relig ion were a rival theory- about

t he s tructure of the natural world.

·

The relig ious attitude as a sense of' t h e possibilities

of ex1stenoe and a s devotion to tho cause or these
poas1bilities, as d1st1not from aooeptanoe of' what ia
g iven a t t.10 time, g:radually- oxtr1oatea itself' from
t hese unnecessary intellectual commitments. But
rel1a ious devotees rarely stop to not1oe t hat '7hat
lies a t the basis of recurrent oonfliots with
sc:tent1f1c f 1nding s is not this or that speo1a1
dogma so TaJUoh as it :Ls alliance with pb11.osoph1oa1
schemes \7ll1ah hold t h at the roalit7 and power of'

-

8

Ibid•• :P• 1..
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\'ina tever is excellent and worth of supreme devotion,
depends upon proof of ita antecedent exiatenoe, so
t hat t he ideal of pertoction loses its olrlim over
ua unloss it c m1 be demonstrated to exist :1n the
sen aa in which the mm and stars oxiat • 9
Fina lly ., grant ing all t hat

08\783"

has j i1ot aaid, t he mea.nure

of 0011aoquent living 'beoom s re1'.tive to the soo~l. s ituation
l'li thin ,·, hich

t he ind1v1dual finds himself and encountors

t ho result s of his s~leotive £orm of behavior.
lio individuaJ. or (;l'Ou p will be judged by wh ether
t hey ccr.1'1le up to or f a ll short of some f'ixed result,
but by t lle direction 1n v1hich they are moving .
The bad man is t he man who no matter how good _hE>
ba::; been is b oginnin5 to deteriorate, to g row leas
sood . The 5 O0d ma11 is the Dlall who no matter how
mo.rally un\1orthy he has been is moving to become
bottor .lO
· ,·,ey is careful 11ot to say that a utopia could r.ell

come in·i;o being if all men v1ere to praotioe a poli cy of
oon sequont livi ng .

t he i s willing to say that '71thout a

doubt soc ial. c onditi ons would be vastly improved by such
action .
t en have never f1.1lly used the po,1ers t h ey possess
to a dvai'lce the g ood 1n life, because they have waited
upon ao1ue power extemal to thom selves and to na tu.re
to do t he vork they are responsible for doing.
Depe.i.' ldence upon an exte2~l. powez, is the counterpart
of' s urrender o-£ human encleavor. Nor is emphasis on
exerc i sing our own powers f'or good an ego1st1oal or
sent imentally optimistic reoourse. It is not the
f i rst~ for it does not isolate man, either ind1v1duall.J'

9

newey~ zueat '£or Oortaint7, PP• 303-304.

10John Dewey. Reoonatruct1on 1n Phil.oaophy (New York:
Henry Holt ~d ~o., 1920), P• Di.
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or collectively. fro.a nature. It is not the second.
because it makeo no assumption beyond that of the
need and re spon sib ility for human endeavor, and beyond
t he conviction t h at, 1r human desire and endeavor were
en listed in behalf' of natural ends, oonclitions T10uld
be b etterecl . I t involves no expectation of a
1!lil le nium of s ood.11
The funclame1'2tal sho1•tooming that porva.des Dev,ey's
entire philo s ophy io t h e problem of prov1d1nG an adequate
motiva tion to i mpel men to use all t he powora t hat are at
t h eir disposal • ..-,het l'ler t he se poners be 1ntornal or external.
If man is inhe rently evil by nature. there 1s ·no nntural
mot.tvation f or a ction that is to be for tho g ood of all.
If man ia neutra l. the1•0 simply 1a no inhorent ,aotivation
o e 'i1ay or the other.

1he only \7ay that anyone can discover

s o e sort of motivation within .....
natu.....,ra-1 .!!!!!l is to sq that
man 1s by nat.7ll'e inclined to consequent and c onsiderate

soc ietal li vin{~.
Indulge f or a moment in an imaginative fliG}lt • • • •
Suppose also me11 had been systematically educated
to believe that tho important thina 1a not to get
t homselvea personally' 'right' 1n relation to tho
antecedent auth or a nd @le.l'antor of these values,
but to .form t heir j udgments and O&ITJ' an their
aottvity on the bas is of public, ob jective and
sh ared consequcmoe a . Imagine tlleee th!nes and then
1 ?!Ja81ne wha t the present situation micht be.12
But still tho question remains as to what rd.ll be the
motivation and who will be the f'1rst

8

eduoator."

11
newoy, A COI!Unon Fa.1th, P• 46.
l.Sne,1ey• Que st for Certa1ntz, p. 4'7 •
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Dewey imagines t l'lat
Barrin g t he .fear a wh ich v,ar leaves in 1 ts train,
it is perhap N a safe specula tion that it contemporary wes•i:iem man were co mpletely deprived of' all the
old b elie f s about knowledge and actions he would
as sume , with a f air degree of conf1denoe, that it
lie s wit h L~ h is power to achieve a reasonable
dee;roo of' security in lif'e.13
Wllat has been tho cause o:!.' these wars,. and so of the

fear s t hat \"1a1"s eneonder in man'l

Dewey feeis tllat

t he en-

v i r onment wi t " its social institutions and social structures
,.s t ne ltey .

If' an envi x•onmtmt that" is both receptive to

111en and t hat p o sitivel.r contributes to men is provided., the
prob l em is solved .
r.e may de sir e a b ol1 t ion of' war, industrial justice,.
gr ont er equality of opportunity f'or all. But no
amount or preach i n g 500d will or the golden rule
or c ultiva tion of sont1ments of love and equity
r;i ll a ccomplish t h e resu1ta. There must be change
in ob jective a rraflGemonts and institutions. ~e
mu.st wor k on the environment not merely on the
hearts 0£ mE>l 'l. To t h ink otherwise is to suppose
t hat rlouera can be raiaed in a desert or motor
oa rs run 1n a juns le. Both things can happen and·
withou t a mi1"aole. Bu.t only by first o!~ ing
t he junele and desart.14

l.Jot1oe t ba t the

11llearts

or

men" v1ll apparently, by themselves.

become positively attuned to the new order and will 1n the
future .function acoord1ng to the spirit of' this new arrangement.
How is it that Dewey takes the attitude that man 1a

13
Ibid., P• 9.

14:oewey, Human Nature and Conduct, PP• 21-22.
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potentially in tl1e prooess of positive development?

0 1IJara

proposes t his o.ns,r;er.
That wh ich distingu1shos Dewey 1s the und1s5uiaed
a ssurance ,·11th wh ich he accepts tho theory- of
evolut ion. ian is for h im the cu.lm1nat1ns exprossion of a long series of evolutionary processes.
Evolution is i nvolted to explain every-thin~ tho.t
e>.;i st s . ne,·,ay' s entire oonoeption excludes the
a cceptance of creation. Consequently, the question
of man ' a 01"13 :tn is 90ttled by him as being
natura listic. He makes man the !ligllest animal
crganiam.15
I t L1i e}lt also be a dded t h at ner,ey is able to settle in l.1ke

ma.'l'Ulor t '!:le question of the nature ot man.

The nature of man

is naturalistic# the highest development of any animal

_or ganism.

Th is can be said, according to

u.

T. Feldimn,

because
Do~e y posits a serial orde~ of natural events~
;hich .fr1lls into definite, well•marked stages.
ton e stat;e in tlle history of our wiiverso, no
l :!.vi n c; or consciou s be1l1g s existed. UP,on the
occurenoe of' ce1"ta1n group1nas of inanimate
ob jects, life appeared. I.find developed only· later,
utter livina croatm"Os had acquired a certain aes ree
of' organization. Each of these st.aaes is a genuine
addition to the cosrno soene, 1.0., its existenoo 1s
not 10 ,ically implicit 1n the state 0£ affairs from
wh ich it developed. This all sounds like a familiar
form of the theory of' emergent evol.ut1on~ but since
~ wey apparently ~1s~es to deny some of the charaoterist1c i mplications of that theory, his reasonings on
thia point must be aorut:Lnized carei'ully. L1.t'e, we
are told • marks the appearance of 1need-demand-sat1sfaction1 in a world to uhich that :taotor had hitherto
been foreign.16
15

James. 0 1 llara, Tho L1m1tat1ona of the Educational 'l'heory
of John Dewez (Washington; D.o.: n.p., l9SO), PP• 2'1-aa.
16u. T. Fe1dman, The Ph1losop~ of John Dewez (Ealt1more1
The Johns Hopkins Pre,ss, 1934). p.4.
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The De\'rey philosophy the11 dea1s with man unlimited.
Bei ng c o 1s i stent, Dewey would say that there is no limit
to t b.e l evels to t''1h1ch :man may dovolop, prov·1 ded he employs

t he proper r11c1uu1s.

De\·1 ey' a methodology of human clevelopment

i s an open - ended math odology.

r.tan can,, 1.f only

he will.

As Le .=3outill1er phrases Dewey• .s tl'lought,
T:.~e universe i s r ealizins its potentialities, and so
i a the l ife of man that represents its most complex
a ctivi ty. Above 111an t h ere are the idealized meanings
or thing s, or t h e ir hiBh,est values: the .further pot e n t i a l ities of hUJtlB.n and natural. existenoa. Dewey
insists t hat t his rea lm 1s aoaessib~e to experience
and t o hu man a c t i on, e. constant challenge to ouza
int elligen ce, our a spira tion and effort~ and is 1n
fact a part of t ho realm of na,ture, t h ougl1 not yet
emb odied :ln fact.17
P..ov,e vcr, ais f'a r as man has presently developed, Dev,ey• a

phi l osoph y hao a str ange 1•011g 1ai a piety, accordins to

La Boutil lier •
•••a devout piety which s ays that there 1s noth ing
beyond nature but t he ideal values man projects
thero to be actualized; and that faith 1n the
po ~sibil i ty of such actualization is a worthy and
an il'ls·, il... ing and a sufficient faith. ?J'an, a part of
nature, i mbued with :1.ntell13ont ideals, can i n telligently bow the knee to nothing le s a and nothing more
t h an the active 1'ela. tion he must contrive between
h i a self and these highest hopes.la

Some pa ges earl!ei' 1n this chapter it

TIS.a

stated that

the measure of consequent l1v111g becomes relative to the

1700:rnelia Le Eout1ll1er, Rel1,a1oua Values 1n the
Ph1loso~ of Emergent Evolution (?Jn Yorks n.p., 1936),
PP• 74-

•

18Ibid., P• 81.

"/r/

social situation \Vithin wh ich tho individual finds himsel.1'

and t i.le oon ~equencea accruing :t'rom his action w1t..'l-i1n that

ai.tue.:t:lon .

J am.cs 0 1 !-ft.\ra. a student of De\"rey v,ho ho.a pub-

lish ed a. study of Dewey's philoaopb.y. o:r:rers this evaluation
or v:1llat has bean called

11

oonsoquent living. 11

Th.e de s tiny o f. Dl!lll is ea.rthJ.y according to Dewey's
nat v~'a l ist i c ai.~d experimental conception of life.
As he denie s t h e existence of the soul• a fortiori
he aeta a side an:y hope of immortality. 7lb'e questfon
a.ri se a : wha:G :ls the highest good in lif'e, aa he
con ceive s it? This may be ansvrored simply by saying
t b.a:b t h e i n divi dual 1s to mke a. return to s ociety
t hat will at least equal what he has received. The
individua l is to cooperate for his ovm upbu11d1ng;
and not n1erely cooperate, but also 1•eaot to life
as ho meets it in order to make hie oontribution.19

Th is., t hen., b ecomes t h e swn, thct eubetanoe and th$ '1?1d of'
lif e as DEmey views it consequentially.

SUIJF:TARY

T'ais final chapter will be a sumn111l7 of Dewey•s
t hought concer ning t lle nature of man.
(!Uite concentratod.

t·Jhat follows 1a

~hat is because all the oonstruct1ve

arsumenta have been dropped off here, tholJ6h they were an
i mportant part of' the preooding chapters.

This chapter

contai.1s only De'i.1ey' a conclusions conoemin§ the naturo

o:r man.
Intelligence is not a gift that ea.oh person has from
birth .

I·I. 1s s anet h:tn5 that develops w1tll1n t h e 1r1d1v1dual

:l11 t he course of

that individual's interacting w:tt~1 other

people a..vid witt. h is .env1ro1 ment.

Intell1genoe is a capacity

that 1s 1n 001'lstant process of .forming.

It is a oapao1ty-

for. intarpretine a roooived social stimulus and responding
to 1t.

Rea.son is eJtperimental, applied intelligence, and

it must al\'m.y s consider the consequences of the rcssponae

t hat it selects.

rrenoe, .for Dewey all activity of the in-

tellect is oriented to the object by evaluating the object
1n terms of e>.-pe r1ence and maltlnc; preferential selections

under the influence of and awareness of oonsequenoes.
Intelligence 1s a product of soo1al aat1on of the individual
1hrouGJ,1 1nteract1nm with others, eaah person influences

other persons and is 1n turn 1n1'luenoed by them.

Tllo infant,
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because of his degree of deve1opmont,, ls more 1nfluenoed
than

1nflueno1ng .

J\.s t he infant grows it malces these sooial

influences ai1d t he accepted modos of response, or habits,
a part of itself.

According to Dewey•s line of reasoning,

t he charaot e~ of the individual 1s t11e sum total of habits
funot ionine; in t he social s1tuat1on.

This be1nrg the

situation, if b ei;ter :man are desired, £ol'DI better habits 1n
t he younga vJho are easily 1nfluenoed, and they mll grow to
be better nien.
DeWOJ'

doe s not accept the oonoept of

II soul, u

'because 1t

cannot be domonstrated empirically that soul exjsta.
Eouovcr., 1n spite of this criterion of empirical demon~
atration ., Dewey holds that mind elDf>rges from the operation

or

i ntell1aenoo in the ~ooial situation.

of course involvos the activity

or

Social il~teraction

the body in a social

situation., and because both body and 1ntellie;enoe, and concomitantly mind, are all .functionally involved together,
Dewey concl1.1.dos that there is a unity of body, mind, nature

and soc 1ety•

By"

th1 s means DeWey denies 8.111' dichotomy of

body and soui, body and mind, or body and personality.

Good and evil, in the metaphya1oa1 or theologioal
sense, do not exist for DeWey.

Ite 1a canoerned onl:, with

an 1ndividual 1 s emotion responses and the oonsequenoea of
tllose responses.
the

In this oanneot:lon De\"fe7 does adm1t that

nature of the oansequenoea var1e•• ancl ao each 1nd1v:1dua1

1a ·held liable for the oonsequanoea ot eaoh of... hia emotion
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re eponse s.

At

the aame time De\7ey notes that the 1nd1v1c2ual' 11

emotion responses are neither poa1t1vel.y nor negativel.1'
oriented.

I.Ian is neutral.

Unfavorable soo1al cond1t1on11

promote unsatisfactory emotion responses.

Hence. improve

social conditions and soc1a1 "evils" \'1111 be el1m1nated •
.

Uni'avora.ble socia l co11di tions are not the result of the

natur e of ~.an.

Rat her they are historical aooidents that

grew out of early nw.11'e failure to employ experinenta1
!ntollieenco -- commonly ca1lod the sc1ent1f1o method.
I f' men v1oul d ,1i1oleh eartedly employ tho so1ent1f1c method

even now. the uhole socinl situation would be rectified 1n
t he cours e of time.

Unfortunately men have not thus far

boen will:I.na to use tho so1ent1.t1c method to this extent,
and ao wo a re v11J.at we are.
The no.turo of man 1s not fixedJ it is pliable•
~ccording ly 0 morels end morality are not fixed ent1t1ea for
ne,1ey.

There 1 s no fixed code of eth1oa •

!.forali ty 1s a

way of life that comes about through a 1cng ·and st111 con-

.

t1nu1ng process of men colleot1ve1y poa1t1ng some aot1on•
testing it. adjusting it, am f'1nally approving it

aoooptable response to a given st11111lua.

a■

.an

i'be detel'Dd.n!ng

raotor that does ttie testing, adjuat1Ds and approving 1a
tho intellectual phase of' obaraoter.

.uowever, there

aN

nany situations which are not oom eDOQgh to have appl'O'W84

responses, and so Dewey speaks al•

~

1n4S.Yldwl11aed

situations, eaoh having lta own 1n'eplaoMb1e goo4 an4
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principles.

U1time.tely this makes all morals and morality

relative to the i nnnediata situation with its oonsequenoes.

Dewey avoids sheer relativism by inserting the factors of
consequenc e ~.nd liab ility.

Dewey does dismiss etemal

tru.ths., but he ,,ould de1'ly that ho dismisses truth.

For

Oer,ey- truth. is on l y t hat wh1oh bas been verified by- t.rie

scientific method.

Mere assent to a~thor1ty or to tradition

for determining t rut h ia not acceptable.
'lbo }urpo se of t h i s study was to dotermL,e Dewey's

potition on tho naturo of man.
sophy waa 5.! tended.

No or1t1que of Dewey's philo-

But one note OUBht to be made oonoel'llincs

Dane;v• s vii ole philosopl11o position in relation to tl1.e natUzte
o:f.' man .

T:.-ie .fundame11tal shortooming that pervades De\'1ey 1 s

entii"e phil osophy is the problem of prov1d1-n g an adequate

n1otiv&t:l01'1 to 1:mpel men to use all the powers that are at

t heir disposa l~ v.lhether these powers be 1nteriial or external .

Dewey has denied t hat man is evil by nature..

denies the n eed for any supernatural redemption.

say t hat

11".a."'l

He

He does

is neutral, bu.t neutrality offers no motivation --

ono way or the other.

The result is that

Do\781'

1s alniost

forced by h is o,m lott;1o to sa:s- that man is inclined to some

so1"t of living that oonsidors the conaequences of every aot..
lie does not say th1s explicitly, but he implies, partly on
the basis 0£ his acceptance of evolution, that it i s entire:q

poaaible to develop men of this na.ture through eduoat1on.
Bllt still the question reDB1ne aa to what will be the

82
motivat1011 and who l'lill be the 1'1rst educator.
The philo sophy of John D8T1ey 1 a a wonderful, lo6 1ca1

complex.

I t h a s bB.PS•

!n number they are 1'ew, but thay

ocour 1n 3Uoh vital spots that the whole 1os 1oal moheme
bangs on nllet h e 1• oz, not a certain assumption 1s Granted.
'li1:l s is the .fata l chortcoming 1n Dowey 1 s whole ph1loso~.
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